CTC TRENDS

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

No. 00-2 **FEB 00**



4QFY98 and 1QFY99

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350

CTC Trends for JRTC 4QFY98 & 1QFY99

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor, Mr. Rick Bogdan, at Coml (913) 684-9581or DSN 552-9581; FAX DSN 552-9583; e-mail: <bogdanr@leavenworth.army.mil>. Articles must be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart must be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this peridocial is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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USER'S GUIDE
JRTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 4th Qtr FY 98 & 1st Qtr FY99

WHAT IS THIS DOCUMENT?

CTC Trends, JRTC contains observations and associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for two quarters (4QFY98 and 1QFY99*)*. The CALL Lessons Learned Division, CTC Branch, collects these observations and TTPs from the respective Observer/Controller (O/C) teams and compiles them in this publication every six months. Organized by the Battlefield Operating System (BOS), the trends reflect both *Positive Performance* and *Needs Emphasis* observations based on quarterly assessment. Trends and TTPs from JRTC's Leader Training Program (LTP) and senior NCOs are included when available.

WHO IS THIS DOCUMENT FOR?

CTC Trends, JRTC is for **tactical field units** to use as a reference for training emphasis at Home Station in preparation for their next JRTC rotation.

CTC Trends, JRTC is for **TRADOC doctrine writers** to identify successful techniques and procedures to include in updates of doctrinal publications.

CTC Trends, JRTC is for **CTC Operations Groups** to use as an historical audit trail of reported observations and TTPs from the JRTC.

HOW DO I USE THIS DOCUMENT?

The trends are organized by BOS. The name of the applicable BOS is indicated at the bottom of each page as a reference.

Given in parenthesis at the beginning of each observation is the branch focus of the O/C team that submitted the observation to CALL (i.e., armor, mech, avn, engr, etc.).

BOS "index" codes are annotated throughout the document. These codes are based on the battlefield structure and definitions presented in **TRADOC Pam 11-9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield***. The *blueprint* provides a common structure of the functions performed by the Army. It serves as a common reference system for analyzing and integrating operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The observations and trends in this publication are at the tactical level. In "TA.5", for example, the TA refers to the tactical level of war; the number "5" is the Intelligence BOS number.

JRTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 4th Qtr FY 98 and 1st Qtr FY 99

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by JRTC O/Cs for 4th quarter, FY98, and 1st quarter, FY 99. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with *Blueprint of the Battlefield* codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Positioning of field artillery assets to support the defense

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery battalions are using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to identify critical movement triggers and future firing battery positions.

DISCUSSION: The enemy's division/brigade reconnaissance elements are unable to locate and attrit friendly forces.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S-2 and staff experience in the process and products needed.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), Step A: Evaluate the threat

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s and intelligence analysts in the military intelligence (MI) company analysis and control teams (ACT) came to the rotations thoroughly prepared with adequate knowledge of the threat they would face.

DISCUSSION: This knowledge was effectively converted into doctrinal templates, databases on threat tactics, and options and high-value target lists.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams appear to be working and must be sustained.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: S-2 section operations

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): A majority of units came to their rotation with full or nearly full S-2 shops. These sections had useful SOPs, and for the most part followed efficient, effective procedures.

DISCUSSION: Units that routinely use their enlisted analysts tended to handle the stress of the CTC rotation better for a number of reasons: (1) the work load seemed to be distributed better; (2) the young soldiers had more situational awareness; and (3) the more experienced NCOs and officers were able to spend more time conducting predictive analysis and visualizing the big picture.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams appear to be working and must be sustained.
2. Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S-2 and staff experience in the process and products needed.

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Collection planning and reconnaissance and security operations and planning

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently failed to plan effective operations to collect the information needed to win.

DISCUSSION: A majority of the units used well-developed matrices as planning tools, thus indicating that they knew what needed to be done. However, not one unit was able to plan and execute a successful reconnaissance plan in any phase of the rotations. Three commonalties characterized intelligence collection failures: lack of focus, timeliness, and supervision. First, reconnaissance missions were unfocused and not linked to the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) or Decision Points (DP). Second, missions were initiated late, they were often uncoordinated, and they were usually not tracked by higher headquarters. Third, units did not have a system to double-check when a named area of interest (NAI) was or was not covered and could not identify gaps in their coverage.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Collection/reconnaissance and security planning must start with receipt of the warning order so that intelligence or reconnaissance teams can begin collection operations while the staff is conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Although this is not possible during initial entry missions, early reconnaissance would allow the staff and commander to make a plan based on *current* intelligence, not just templated enemy situations. Commanders must strive to ensure they have a well-focused

collection effort. This includes limiting the number of tasks given to collection assets, ensuring tasks are tied to PIR or DPs, and ensuring the plan uses all assets available. Example: A scout platoon can *only* pinpoint an objective and then observe it. **Reconnaissance operations should pull maneuver units toward enemy weaknesses or vulnerabilities.** Too often units force reconnaissance down one axis to support an inflexible friendly course of action.

1. Small maneuver elements can conduct aggressive patrolling operations to help the reconnaissance plan. For example, the JRTC OPFOR often probes defenses; likewise, infantry platoons can probe the OPFOR's defense. They just need to be trained to do so prior to deployment.
2. There is no hard and fast rule on the number of NAIs that a unit can handle. However, the brigade staff must recognize that each NAI tasked to a subordinate unit becomes a specified task to them during the mission analysis.
3. S-2s and S-3s must have a combined method of tracking the collection/reconnaissance and security operation. Although planned by the S-2, the S-3 must maintain visibility over this set of combat assets maneuvering on the battlefield. One technique is to post an NAI chart next to the map that shows when an NAI is active, what is being reported, and when it should go inactive. This must be a staff battle drill practiced by all members of the S-2 and S-3 sections.
4. When combining assets from different units for reconnaissance missions, such as Marine FCTs, LLVI teams, and scouts, sufficient command, control and communications must be built in. These missions must be well coordinated and rehearsed routinely at Home Station prior to deployment. A rule of thumb is that when two like-sized units join to form a reconnaissance team, a headquarters from the next higher unit is probably needed.
5. Collection plans must be tied to the commander's key decision points. If a valuable asset is placed in a risky situation for no reason to support the tactical operation, then that asset is potentially wasted.
6. Reconnaissance is everyone's business. Every combat leader must conduct a reconnaissance as part of routine troop-leading procedures and be involved with running the entire TOC.

(TA.5 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): IBP is a weak point for most aviation units.

DISCUSSION: The modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), normally developed at Home Station, is usually not updated and used during a unit's rotation. Additionally, units habitually do not refine the doctrinal and situational templates provided by brigade, nor do they develop event templates other than for the defense phase.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. Units must develop a decision support template.
2. Review **FM 34-130*, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.***

(TA.5.2 Collect Information)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and security collection

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently failed to plan effective operations to collect the information needed to win.

DISCUSSION: Same as TREND 1.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as TREND 1.

(TA.5.2 Collect Information)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Aviation units conducting search and attack operations

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units conduct search and attack operations using either a zone reconnaissance, an area reconnaissance, or hasty attacks as a finishing force. The commander may specify other reconnaissance objectives in his intent, but finding the enemy should be the focus.

DISCUSSION: Adherence to the critical tasks associated with a zone/area reconnaissance and the commander's PIR will help define the purpose of the reconnaissance for aircrews. Flight techniques are important while conducting the zone reconnaissance.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units that plan a zone/area reconnaissance with supporting graphics and control measures have greater success in thoroughly searching a zone. For a zone reconnaissance, the graphics break a zone up into logical segments that can be systematically executed; i.e., phase line to phase line.
2. Due to the nature of the terrain, it is imperative that aircrews fly slow enough to search down into the trees. A common trend is for the aircrews to fly at speeds between 50-80 knots, which is too fast! Crews that slow down to speeds from ETL to 30 knots are more successful in finding the enemy, cache sites, and other targets.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance/security and counterreconnaissance

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Units are generally showing sound tactical logic in the organization and command and control of security and reconnaissance forces. However, the actual tactical employment usually does not rise to the potential of the concept.

DISCUSSION: A significant factor contributing to this is that the planning effort is not commensurate with the concept. Units should always conduct parallel planning. If any mission guidance goes out before the base order, it is frequently verbal or in the form of a sketchy WARNO.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The security/reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance operation, therefore, tends to get executed based almost entirely on this type mission guidance.

2. The security/reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance effort of any operation should have its own mission analysis. This would also tend to be dictated by, and in accordance with, the troop- leading procedures where "initiate reconnaissance" follows the first four steps. The step "form a tentative plan," refers to the overall operation, not to tentative security/reconnaissance/ counterreconnaissance plans.

3. This plan must be thoroughly developed and analyzed prior to committing forces to the security zone. The "initiate movement" step does not mean that forces occupy the security zone absent anything but a verbal FRAGO or initial WARNO. Yet this is exactly what most units do, deferring full development of the security zone fight to simultaneous/parallel development along with the main operational plan. By the time that order is issued, forces in the security zone are usually already committed and with insufficient troop-leading procedures under their belts.

4. The solution is to execute a separate set of TLP steps for the security/reconnaissance/ counterreconnaissance fight and thoroughly develop a plan/order for this fight. One of the most significant purposes of the security effort is to assist refining the main COA.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Leader training in light/heavy tactics

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Leader training in light/heavy tactics needs to emphasize combined arms and intelligence issues.

DISCUSSION: FOCUS LEADER TRAINING. Leaders need to be able to conduct a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of their sector, understanding the threat to heavy vs light forces. They need to know how to develop a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) to identify restricted and unrestricted terrain. They must be able to build an engagement area, and command and control tanks and Bradley's in the offense and in MOUT.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **FM 34-130*, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*.**
2. Read **CALL Newsletter No. 96-12*, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***.
3. Read **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12*, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."***
4. Read **CALL Newsletter No. 98-10*, Fighting Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain*.**

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Using the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Some units do quite well developing and using the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) portion of CCIR. Many do not. Additionally, the overall trend to date is that units frequently misuse or do not use the elements of CCIR at all. The

PIR do not answer the few specific items the commander needs to know to execute his plan. All too frequently the PIR are questions the S-2 may need answered; however, these answers are usually the last elements required to form an intelligence estimate, which, in turn, allows the commander's PIR to be addressed. Friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) are likewise not used effectively. EEFI are probably the enemy commander's PIR, but are almost never developed with this in mind.

DISCUSSION: Commanders must better articulate their vision of how the battle will be fought and why it will be fought that way. Doing this will assist the staff in making PIR recommendations that are pertinent to the essence of what the commander really needs to know (his decisions!).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S-2s need to put themselves in their commanders' place and recognize that the intelligence officers' requirements are not necessarily PIR, but rather are IR that need to be analyzed, processed, and packaged for the commander.
2. The importance of FFIR goes well beyond listing them on a chart in the TOC. FFIR should include items that are critical to the success of the operation and relate directly to the PIR/commander's decisions from a BLUFOR perspective. For example, is the status of M1 tanks an FFIR that needs to be tracked because the loss of a portion of this asset may render the selected COA infeasible?

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Prepare and check overlay graphics

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Once the overlay is complete, units are not rechecking the information depicted to ensure the essential information is posted.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Once the overlay is complete, double-check the information to ensure the following items are identified and clearly depicted:

1. Enemy overall mission.
2. Task and purpose of each unit tracked.
3. Boundaries for all units two levels down.
4. Templated locations of assets and systems two levels down (e.g., battalion logistics points, company supply points, platoon caches, and so on).
5. Main and supporting efforts.
6. Time phase lines for those elements that will move.
7. Annotations of operational times or patterns for those elements that will not make significant movement (e.g., minelaying operations between 0400-0630 each day).
8. Key and decisive terrain.
9. Population status as appropriate.

Remember, neatness counts. If you plan to reproduce the overlay on a black and white field copier, make sure it is legible. This product can be a decisive factor in your victory or defeat.

(TA.5.2.1.1 Collect Threat Information)

TREND 9

SUBJECT: The targeting process

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Too often chemical personnel are left out of the daily brigade and battalion targeting and synchronization meetings.

DISCUSSION: As a result, input from chemical personnel is lacking. Meetings that exclude the chemical officers and their NCOs renders the assets they oversee ineffective. The targeting and synchronization process allows the brigade to ensure the effective servicing of targets as well as ensuring the integration and synchronization of all the brigade's battlefield operating systems, to include NBC.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. One of the major products from a meeting of this nature is a daily FRAGO addressing operations 48-72 hours out. The chemical officer must be involved in this process if his work is to be coordinated with the battle staff and have timely influence on the brigade fight.
2. **FM 6-30-10, *The Targeting Process,*** and **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations***, provide the chemical officer a good starting point for understanding the process.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 10

SUBJECT: Using unit intelligence indicators for targeting

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Many units do not use intelligence indicators for targeting.

DISCUSSION: Units do not suffer from a lack of intelligence concerning enemy activity, but from the lack of an established methodology for turning enemy intelligence into friendly action. For example, an enemy mortar is located within two to three hundred meters of the S-2's templated location. Over a period of days, the mortar is acquired by the Q36 on one or more occasions (displacing prior to counter-battery fires), is heard by scouts or infantry, is resupplied by enemy aircraft, and fires on friendly units on multiple occasions. Despite the number of events, the targeting team is unable to analyze the numerous indicators, arrive at a decision about the mortar's likely location, and mass combat power against a high-payoff target.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Techniques for targeting are discussed in **CALL Newsletter No. 97-8*, Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,*** Feb 97.
2. Review the JRTC video, "How to Conduct Targeting Meetings," available from CALL on line or by mail.

(TA.5.2.2.4 Identify Targets)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Use of analysis control teams (ACTs)

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aerial scouts employed with only a single aircraft have minimal survivability, which also jeopardizes continuous operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. The two analysis control teams (ACTs) of a divisional cavalry squadron do not facilitate continuous operations for more than a 24-hour period before starting to experience resource issues.

2. Many units, in an effort to maintain continuous operations, are conducting "single ship" reconnaissance missions rather than scout/weapon team operations. A single aircraft without a wingman or overwatch element is at *exceptional risk* on the battlefield. Not only is the aircraft much more likely to be engaged, but if it is shot down there is no one to assist in its security or recovery.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. A proper IPB, along with a good reconnaissance and security plan that uses redundant collectors arrayed in depth, will provide a good read on the enemy's timeline and scheme of maneuver. The intelligence read should be good enough to allow a *surge* of aerial reconnaissance assets to meet the threat as needed. This would conserve the limited availability of aerial reconnaissance assets based on crews and maintenance.

2. Units should focus OH-58Ds for use at night (when they are the most effective and least vulnerable) for critical events such as security operations and movement of the enemy's main body.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Developing an integrated threat picture

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Brigade intelligence officers are not developing integrated threat plans.

DISCUSSION: Brigade S-2s tend to focus excessively on squads, mortars, SA14s, caches, etc., without relating the enemy's employment of these to an integrated enemy plan. In other words, S-2s are not answering the questions: (1) "Why is the enemy doing what he is doing?" and (2) "Why is the enemy commander synchronizing his operations in this way?" The main reason that this integrated picture is not being developed is that brigade XOs, brigade S-3s, and intelligence staff sections are not requiring the other operating systems/combat multipliers to give input to the intelligence officer. Brigade commanders are accepting less than a fully integrated enemy COA which relates and explains how and WHY the enemy will employ each of his capabilities in the given COA. Just like BLUFOR, the enemy commander has limited resources with which to work. He must strive to synchronize his effort to maintain the twin options of economy of force and mass at the decisive points. BLUFOR units tend to attack/chase/seek enemy "things" rather than attack the enemy plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The fix is to have commanders be more demanding of their S-2s and not accept one-dimensional analysis. They must learn to ask the tougher "WHY" questions of the intelligence officer.

2. Brigade XOs must ensure that during mission analysis, all staff sections put on their "red hats" and perform an IPB. Brigade S-3s must ensure that prior to the mission analysis briefing the S-2 has had sufficient time to integrate input from the other operating systems/combat multipliers into his IPB.

3. Brigade S-2s must mature beyond being battalion S-2s to recognize that they will never have an integrated threat picture unless they integrate information from other operating systems/combat multipliers into their IPB.

4. These fixes outline some good Home Station training objectives for S-2/"slice" integrated training.

(TA.5.3.4. Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Analysis of time in the defense

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Units are doing much better at developing a detailed timeline analysis for the defense. The residual problem is one of integration.

DISCUSSION: Typically, the XO or S-3 develops this plan independently of the rest of the staff. If the staff does have input, it is in the form of a checklist of actions without sufficient analysis of time needed, time necessary, and status of resources. As a result, the timeline briefs well but seldom gets executed. Immediately, the lack of analysis shows through friction in preparation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The staff working on the defense must look at the time available, the current status of resources (people and equipment/supplies), the critical tasks that must be accomplished, the important tasks that may have to receive lower priority, and the places where modifications to tasks have to be made (i.e., when the results of the enemy's reconnaissance shows that the staff is building the wrong defense).

2. An SOP for an infantry squad, platoon, or company, usually has four priorities of work and is a good starting point on a brigade timeline.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Identify risk in a tactical operation

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Most units do an adequate or better job of identifying risk in a tactical operation. Typically this is to "the rear." However, units do nothing to mitigate risk. Risk doctrine requires identification of mitigating factors to reduce the risk and make it manageable.

DISCUSSION: In Cortina, rear units get hit hard. This example can be extended to any number of other areas of risk. The rear is often considered an area of risk.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must commit resources in some way to mitigate risk, otherwise it is not risk they are accepting. (Seldom is anything that is identified as risk shows up as PIR, EEFI or FFIR...think about that!) Where the units are willing to accept risk is probably exactly what the enemy would like to know. There are at least two ways this can be addressed.

1. Risk must be incorporated into the COA analysis (and wargamed as a branch or sequel).
2. If units are doing predictive analysis and are "looking ahead 48 hours," they can exercise economy of force by committing resources tomorrow to shape the area where they anticipate risk the day after tomorrow.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Enemy threat templating

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently fail to accurately portray their predicted enemy courses of action in a graphic enemy event template.

DISCUSSION: The event template is the culmination of the IPB process. As such, it is vitally important, arguably the most important analytical product, to support the MDMP and the targeting process, and to fight the close battle. Without a clearly drawn event template, it is almost impossible for the S-2 to integrate his prediction of the enemy into the commander's and battle staff's decision cycle. Unfortunately, most S-2s were not able to produce an event template for a majority of the battles.

1. S-2s did not adequately delegate the workload required during the MDMP to their subordinates. This is especially true in regard to their enlisted 96B Intelligence Analysts, who were nothing more than well-trained radio operators and map plotters. Instead, the trend was for S-2s and assistant S-2s to do all of the IPB themselves. As a consequence, the S-2s generally ran out of time and energy just when they started their event template and usually presented a woefully inadequate product.
2. Brigade and battalion XOs do not have a complete understanding of what products to expect from their S-2s at each stage of the MDMP and the time it takes to prepare those products. Often at the JRTC, XOs established planning timelines that gave their staff less than an hour from the completion of the division operation order to the mission analysis brief. In those cases where S-2s were not able to start the IPB prior to the division order, their IPB products suffered in quality from the beginning. Since IPB is a process whereby each product builds upon the analysis of the last product, it is critical that the early products are done well. In most cases, the S-2s generally fell behind from the beginning, were forced to sacrifice the quality of early products to adhere to an arbitrary time schedule, and, as a consequence, were unable to produce accurate event templates later.
3. MI doctrine is not clear on how to complete event templates for every mission. IPB was designed for defensive operations, and most S-2s have a clear understanding of how to complete the event template while in the defense. However, few have the knowledge or

experience to adequately portray the enemy in space and time during movement-to-contact missions, deliberate attacks, or other offensive operations. The S-2 must step away from doing the detailed work of IPB and take a few minutes to think about how to portray his prediction of the enemy course of action.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: **FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,*** addresses the enemy event template in detail. However, it treats it as another equal step in the analytical process. In fact, the first step to fixing this trend is for S-2s, commanders, and XOs to accept that the event template is a goal of the process, vital to the success of the unit's mission.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Use of intelligence overlays

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Units' use of overlays in course-of-action (COA) planning is a management problem.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Consider stacking intelligence overlays on the map in the following order: MCOO, operations graphics, enemy COAs. Next, place a blank drop over these and combine the different COAs into one overall template. Ensure it is clear where the COAs merge and diverge. Where they diverge, look for where the enemy commander would have to make a decision on a particular COA and place a symbol for a decision point there.
2. In those places where the enemy's presence would indicate he has adopted a particular COA, place a symbol for a named area of interest. Based on the enemy's mission and the task and purpose of each element, show where the enemy wants to move and how long it will take him to get there using time phase lines.
3. Finally, add any other details necessary to show how the enemy is expected to operate in the future. If it is important to show his entire logistical system, then do so. Keep it simple and legible, but make it as detailed as necessary.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Gathering the products necessary for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): The initial steps for conducting the IPB process are hampered by the lack of products necessary in following the procedures.

DISCUSSION: The first step in the IPB process is to gather the necessary products completed early and to check to see that they are complete. The first product needed is the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). At a minimum it should display the critical factors of observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA), especially key and decisive terrain, and the effects of weather. The product does not need to

show every nuance of the terrain, just the results of the analysis. The next group of products is the enemy course-of-action overlays developed early in the IPB process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Each overlay should have at least the following: enemy mission and potential task organization, enemy decisive point, task and purpose of each unit, main effort, supporting effort, unit boundaries, and objectives as appropriate.
2. In this TTP, brigade and battalion S-2s should concentrate on analyzing the enemy in the above detail two levels below the senior enemy unit (i.e., if you are fighting a battalion, then you would track two levels below that [platoons]). The S-2 should not try to template down to every team and weapon system.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Templating the chemical threat

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): S-2s at brigade and battalion often fail to produce a template of where, based on analysis, they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: S-2s at the tactical level do a poor job of templating a potential chemical threat. Chemical personnel at both brigade and battatlion often fail to produce a template of where, based upon their analysis, they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield. A sound template will drive the NBC decontamination and reconnaissance effort.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The chemical officer must possess an understanding of how the enemy is organized to fight, and this can be found in the enemy order of battle. Once the chemical officer understands the enemy order of battle, he need only conduct reverse analysis to ascertain where he thinks the enemy will employ agents and then depict these locations on his template.
2. The chemical officer must design a decontamination and reconnaissance plan that covers the depth and width of his battlespace, and allows him to focus his limited resources with respect to location on the ground and times of enemy use of agents.
3. The chemical officer must coordinate with the S-2 to ensure that they are presenting the identical picture for their respective commanders, and then publish the results to the subordinate units as per **FM 34-130*, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*.**

(TA.5.4.3 Prepare Tactical Intelligence Reports)

MANEUVER BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Terrain flight techniques

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aircrews are using traveling overwatch and bounding overwatch techniques during their reconnaissance missions.

DISCUSSION: During the search and attack phase when contact with enemy forces is possible, the overwatching element is keying its movement off the wingman and terrain as much as possible. Mutual support is readily available for the teams conducting the missions. The "team concept" or "wingman concept" is being properly executed for the most part. On occasion, team members become separated by a distance that does not lend itself to immediate support if an aircraft is engaged.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders make the call to "accept risk" by separating a team based on the enemy situation.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Occupation plan

OBSERVATION (EAD CSS): One of the most neglected areas during deployment is the occupation plan. Many units do not take the time to properly develop an occupation plan.

DISCUSSION: The occupation plan is critical since it is the first action on which many others are based. The actual occupation sets the tempo for the rest of the operation. An occupation that is on time will enable the unit to properly set and prepare for support operations. It is not unusual to see units take 36 to 48 hours to finish the occupation. Usually by then they are immersed in support operations, unable to effectively do either.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop an occupation plan and stick to it. The plan should be part of the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and take into account mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T). Do not try to make drastic changes after the equipment arrives on site; it is too late. Ensure that every element is well versed on the plan through wargaming and sand table rehearsals.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Actions on contact

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units continue to perform poorly during the first moments of contact with enemy units. Battle drills are not automatic reactions and often result in indiscriminate fire and movement by individuals.

DISCUSSION: Problems include an initial hesitation to react, lack of knowledge of battle drills at the squad and platoon level, and collective tasks. There is a failure to establish a base of fire sufficient to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to a flank or breaking contact, and a failure to include indirect fire assets in the fire. The majority of platoon actions-on-contact result in the enemy escaping with few casualties and friendly forces sustaining several casualties.

Leaders are hesitant to re-position soldiers to improve the effectiveness of their weapons or to seek better cover and concealment. Units fail to plan for or rehearse actions-on-contact prior to mission execution. Soldiers' aggressiveness and marksmanship, although usually done without any regard to battle drills or doctrine, sometimes wins the day in the close fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **ARTEP 7-8,** ***Drill,*** Nov 1993.
2. Review **FM 7-8,** ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.***
3. Reference ***CALL NTC Trends Compendium No. 97-17***, Sep 97, Actions on Contact.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Company and platoon-level fire support drills

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Company and platoon-level fire support drills are consistently well done.

DISCUSSION: At the platoon and company level, battle drills are being executed and synchronized which enable successful fires to be executed on obstacles and engagement areas (EA).

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 97-11, *Fighting with Fires III,*** Apr 93.
2. View **CALL Video Tape No. 3, *Direct Fire Execution***.

(TA.2.2.1.1 Conduct Surface Attack)

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Use of Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR)

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): During the low-intensity conflict (LIC) and deliberate attack phases, most forward observers (FO) do not have their PLGRs on or in the continuous mode while moving.

DISCUSSION: More often than not, the lead element of the platoon makes contact and the FO has lost his ability to use the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Keep the PLGR on and in the continuous mode, and upon a chance contact use it to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission using the polar plot call for fire.
2. Read and review **TM 11-5825-29-13**.
3. Implement the techniques described in the article ***"The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight,"*** **CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-10, 4th Qtr, FY 96, Oct 96.**

(TA.2.1 Process Ground Targets)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Q36 operations

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery planners/decision-makers fail to adequately plan target acquisition assets due to a basic lack of general radar knowledge. Field artillery planners do not understand the basic requirements of the firefinder radar system.

DISCUSSION: This lack of knowledge becomes apparent when units plan for future operations. The targeting technician assigned to the radar is the resident expert. Unfortunately, units tend to limit the targeting technician's input to only site selection and after-the-fact recommendations. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to execute unrealistic plans. Field artillery tactical operations centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than is physically possible.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.
2. Conduct extensive professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at Home Station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience.
3. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system; i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and the terrain.
4. The targeting technician must be an integral member of the FA battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early to surface potential problems.
5. Conduct realistic radar training at Home Station; i.e., limited friendly fire and more hostile fire operations.

(TA.2.1.2.1 Determine System Capability)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Howitzer range cards

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing batteries continue to not complete or partially complete howitzer range cards.

DISCUSSION: Often howitzer range cards do not contain direct-fire targets or data for APERS or killer junior. Many units come to the JRTC and never use range cards at all.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Battery leadership should review **FM 6-50,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery***, and howitzer range cards should be the focus of continued training.
2. Every soldier must understand that the range card is invaluable in orienting the howitzer when engaging direct-fire targets. The battery leadership must provide checks and balances. See **FM 6-50**, Chapter 3, pp. 3-12.

(TA.2.1.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Out-of-traverse/6400-mil operations

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing units often display difficulty in conducting out-of-traverse missions.

DISCUSSION: The XO fails to derive the minimum QE for each octant; the fire direction center (FDC) fails to compute terrain gun position correction (TGPCs) for each octant; the howitzer sections have equipment (usually the prime mover or camouflage net) that prohibits true 6400-mil capability. Additionally, howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly which results in the inability to have an aiming reference point and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable with using aiming posts to pick up displacement. In many instances, units are not using distant aiming points (DAP) despite them being available. The result is terribly slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter-fire missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Read and review **FM 6-40,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery,*** **FM 6-50,** ***Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,*** and the appropriate howitzer **–10.**
2. Ensure the XO/CFB and FDC understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out-of-traverse missions to include properly setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6400-mils.
3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.
4. Frequently rehearse out-of-traverse dry-fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.
5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate and not hinder 6400-mil operations.

(TA.2.1.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Mortar employment in close contact

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

DISCUSSION: Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are not exercising "tactical patience" and allowing their observers and fire support officers (FSOs) to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy. Company FSOs and platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60-mm and 81-mm mortars along the unit's route.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route on templated enemy positions and likely ambush sites.

2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next. The FO uses the minimum safe distance of the weapon system designated to fire the target as the trigger to shift to the new target.

3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy. See ***"Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight"*** in the ***FA Journal,*** March-April 1996.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Accuracy of mortars

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): FSOs are not providing timely meteorological data (MET) or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars.

DISCUSSION: Mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S-3 to get MET messages (computer MET if the unit is using the mortar ballistic computer) and survey support. The maneuver task force should be included in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).

2. The FSO, in concert with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units will conduct the registrations for the mortars and ensure that this tasking is included in the OPORD.

(TA.2.2.1.1 Conduct Surface Attack)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: LTACFIRE operations

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Although rotational units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely exploit the capabilities of the Light Tactical Fire Direction System/Initial Fire Support Automated System (LTACFIRE/IFSAS).

DISCUSSION: Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction. The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria. Inexperienced operators, along with the failure of the chain of command to force the use of the system, are the primary reasons. While units often have excellent LTACFIRE standing operating procedures, they are rarely used. Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. To exploit the system, both operators and leaders must fully understand its capabilities. Effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios, should be established and enforced to instill confidence.

2. Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all Home Station training events to ensure that it becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Survey operations

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Survey support is not maximizing the use of all assets. Initial field artillery support plans (FASP) have done a good job in directing survey support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control.

DISCUSSION: Unfortunately, the trend is for survey support to cease after the firing batteries and radar are complete. Units exert minimum effort or consideration to assets in the task force; i.e., 81-mm mortars, OH-58D, COLTS, targets, routes, and obstacles.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Ensure planning in the survey annex in the field artillery support plan (FASP) encompasses all assets in the task force that require survey.

2. Review **FM 6-2*, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Field Artillery Survey,*** specifically Chapters 14 and 15, and figure 15-1 (FSCOORD checklist).

3. Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station focusing on the importance of effective survey.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 9

SUBJECT: Integration of indirect fire during small unit contacts

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to employ indirect fires during chance contact.

DISCUSSION: Platoon leaders maneuver their squads into their own indirect fire or cancel the mission prior to it being fired. Squad leaders and platoon leaders are not aware or comfortable with call-for-fire and its employment. The result is that units fail to integrate indirect fires into contact, thus reducing the combat power ratio. This allows the enemy to break contact on their own terms.

Units are not trained or aware of FO react-to-contact battle drill. Poor situational awareness by maneuver units causes slow clearance of fires in the company sector. Mortar sections are not ready to fire in a timely manner because they have been lulled into complacency from inactivity.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Cross-train leaders at TSFO and during 60-mm mortar live fires.
2. Incorporate indirect fire into all training. (Do not always task the mortar section to be OPFOR at Home Station training.)
3. Educate leaders on the use of minimum safe distances and clearance of fires while conducting tactical movements.
4. Use 60-mm mortars to cover the direction the OPFOR is most likely to break contact.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

AIR DEFENSE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Target engagement procedures

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Fire units are successful in acquisition, visual recognition, interrogation, and engagement of hostile aircraft.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should continue to reinforce training each element of unit firing criteria at Home Station.

(TA.3.1 Process Air Targets)

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Early warning (EW) planning

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Early warning planning continues to be the most difficult challenge air defense batteries encounter.

DISCUSSION: During the planning process, air defense officers (ADOs) do not provide specific procedures for sensor management and early warning dissemination within the battery. Sensor team chiefs are left out of the battery MDMP process. Batteries do not address EW frequency management, sensor looping, sensor chaining, or maintenance management as part of the overall sensor management plan. This creates problems in maintaining early warning link-up with fire units. Batteries experience difficulties in getting all fire units to monitor digital early warning. Fire units lack confidence using the handheld terminal units (HTUs). Batteries must improve in operating and integrating the system into their daily air defense operations.

There are inconsistencies within batteries to monitor the division's early warning (DEW) net. Many teams receive early warning through platoon or battery nets instead of directly through the DEW. The effect is that fire units receive EW late because it is rebroadcast, as opposed to near real-time from the DEW. This affects target engagement. Batteries do not execute a C3I commex prior to deployment. This would identify inoperable HTUs and verify if the Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) is loaded properly. Batteries must use and exploit the AMDWS more effectively.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Recommend developing training scenarios to enhance fire units' confidence in the HTUs and exploit the full range of the AMDWS capabilities.
2. Develop a troubleshooting checklist to ensure functionality of AMDWS and HTUs.
3. Recommend batteries and platoons review technical manuals on the operation of HTUs and develop training exercises to enhance familiarity with use and employment.
4. Recommend batteries conduct a C3I commex prior to each operation. Batteries need to add to their TSOP C3I TTPs on:
    a. Linkage architecture
    b. Correlation of tracks
    c. Troubleshooting procedures

(TA.3.1.3 Develop Order to Fire at Air Targets)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Fratricide prevention

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units have made an improvement in air and ground integration resulting in a reduction in fratricides.

DISCUSSION: Units continue to appreciate the importance of the rules of engagement (ROE) and have taken significant measures to ensure all members understand and follow them.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Aviation units must continue to ensure this trend is sustained. A good starting point is to develop unit fratricide prevention standing operating procedures (SOPs).
2. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 92-4,** ***A Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses***.

(TA.6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Survivability

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, Class IV planning, and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Plan for the use of engineers for unit survivability.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

<u>TREND 3</u>
SUBJECT: Aircraft maintenance

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aircraft maintenance continues to be one of the strong points of assault/heavy lift units.

DISCUSSION: Units routinely average an operational ready (OR) rate of 85 percent during a rotation.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue operational maintenance throughout the deployment.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Plotting chemical attacks

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Brigade and battalion NBC personnel continually display a firm understanding of the necessary skills required to plot chemical attacks.

DISCUSSION: These staff officers and NCOs possess a keen understanding of manuals and doctrine.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review **FM 3-3*, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance***.
2. Review **FM 3-7*, NBC Field Handbook***.

(TA.6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Route clearance and combined arms breaching

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Consistently, brigade staffs have difficulty in developing detailed route clearance plans.

DISCUSSION: The heavy team's mobility, organic countermine equipment (CME), and dependence on ground supply lines make it a likely candidate to conduct route clearance. Once obstacles are encountered and a bypass is not found, the heavy team (and the brigade) has been impeded for up to 12 hours in successfully breaching an obstacle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Before a heavy team is employed to conduct a combined arms breach, it must be task-organized with sufficient dismounted infantry and engineers to conduct the mission.
2. The heavy team must have sufficient time to plan and rehearse the breaches.
3. Review **FM 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations,*** for detailed information on the employment of CME in mechanical breaching.

(TA.6.1.1 Overcome Obstacles)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Mine usage

OBSERVATION (TF 1): During the defense units do not effectively use available mine assets.

DISCUSSION: The execution of the obstacle plan typically begins to unravel when the quantity of mines planned for exceeds, often by two-thirds, what is actually available to the unit. Competing priorities of work, distribution, and time management difficulties prevent units from emplacing those mines that they do have. Over the past two quarters, an average of 64 percent of available mines distributed to companies were never emplaced prior to the no-later-than defend time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conventional mine laying is labor, resource, and transport intensive. Detailed planning is a requirement for successful execution.
2. Review **FM 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations*.**

(TA.6.2.2.1 Emplace Mines)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Positioning of crew-served weapons

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing batteries/platoons routinely do a poor job of positioning their crew-served weapons.

DISCUSSION: Sectors of fire are not interlocking, fields of fire are not cleared, weapons are emplaced without considering the characteristics of terrain (dead space, trees, avenues of approach, hills, etc.). Additionally, soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card or how the T&E mechanism functions. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons proficiency. The end result is that despite the enormous firepower available to a battery, the unit is unable to defend itself against a dismounted attack of three to five men.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Read and review **FM 6-50, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,*** Chapter 3, and **STP 6-13Bl4-SM-TG,** pg. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons' emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire, and, most importantly, positioning all crew-served weapons in a manner that maximizes their effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
3. Consider identifying the positions of crew-served weapons prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
4. Crew-served weapons' positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader (BC or 1SG) to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.

(TA.6.3.1 Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Protecting the force

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units fail to effectively defend their assembly areas with organic personnel.

DISCUSSION: The primary shortcomings are training and command emphasis. The average aviation officer and NCO are poorly trained in basic soldiering skills. Common soldier tasks such as "Prepare a Fighting Position" and "Prepare a Sector Sketch" are not well understood by aviation leaders and, as a result, are not performed to standard by soldiers. Engineer assets must be used to compensate for the lack of manpower.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders at all levels must read and understand **FM 7-8,** ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,*** for techniques and standards for defensive measures.
2. Review **FM 7-10,** ***The Infantry Rifle Company.***

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Conduct CSS by air

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): There is very little usage of air assets for CSS.

DISCUSSION: There are many elements to conducting CSS by air that have not been discussed: pickup zones (PZs) and landing (LZs), primary and alternate routes in and out, security, load rigging, and inspection. Also, other factors that must be considered include Army airspace command and control (A2C2), ADA, and the ever-present threat of the opposing forces (OPFOR).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 4 above.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Force protection

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Force protection continues to challenge units.

DISCUSSION: Units often fall back on the belief that they do not have the assets available to conduct adequate force protection. However, rotations frequently do not use Class IV and ignore recommendations set forth in appropriate field manuals and consequently fail to achieve acceptable levels of force protection.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review force protection in **FM 7-8,** ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.***
2. Review force protection in **FM 7-10,** ***The Infantry Rifle Company.***

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Disabled Aircraft Repair and Recovery (DARRT)

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Commanders at battalion level and below do not realize that Combat Search and Rescue and Disabled Aircraft Repair and Recovery are two separate missions.

DISCUSSION: Each mission is required by doctrine to be included in operations orders (OPORDs) and standing operating procedures (SOPs). CSAR is designed to recover crews, assess the aircraft, and provide security for the disabled aircraft. DARRT is a separate mission used to recover the aircraft from the battlefield.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Review CSAR and DARRT procedures in **FM 1-500,** ***Army Aviation Maintenance;*** **FM 1-513,** ***Battlefield Recovery and Evacuation of Aircraft;*** **FM 90-18,** ***(CSAR) Multiservice Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue;*** and **FM 1-101,** ***Aviation Battlefield Survivability.***

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Survivability

OBSERVATION (ADA): Battery leadership does not enforce fighting position standards through their tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

DISCUSSION: Survivability is not sufficiently emphasized at each leadership level to ensure teams survive on the battlefield.

1. Team chiefs procrastinate in executing their priorities of work.
2. Fire units remain in the same position for days without improving their fighting and/or firing positions.
3. Supplementary positions are seldom selected or movements to them rehearsed.
4. Caches are not dug in.

Results:

1. Fire units are destroyed through either direct or indirect ground contact or by rotary-wing aircraft.
2. ADOs at brigade or battalion level do not recommend air defense assets as a priority for engineer survivability effort.
3. Although teams are aggressive in seeking engineer support, there is no synchronization of engineer effort.
4. Batteries have no tracking tools to ensure survivability awareness.

5. BDE/TF ADOs do not disseminate obstacle plans or friendly mine caches to fire units during the defense. This results in teams being destroyed by reseeded minefields.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders must enforce survivability standards by checking team positions.
2. Leaders must plan survivability as part of every mission.
3. Units should develop a TACSOP standard.
4. Review **FM 44-18-1, *Stinger Team Operations,*** and **FM 5-103, *Survivability***.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Perimeter defense

OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): Basic soldier skills are often lacking in the preparation and execution of defensive measures.

DISCUSSION:

1. Marksmanship is routinely poor.
2. Fighting positions seldom meet common task training (CTT) standards even after several days of occupation in the same area.
3. Commanders often delegate the force protection to a junior officer with little experience in how to lay out defensive positions with overlapping fires, obstacle placement and preparation, use of LP/OPs, use of early warning devices, use of QRF, and so on.
4. Junior leaders, especially at the NCO level, lack collective force protection skills and often rely on the attitude that "someone else will take care of them."
5. Few units understand the concepts and coordination required for use of a tactical combat force in the corps rear. Over time, units tend to improve their reaction to OPFOR, but only after suffering numerous casualties.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Soldiers must learn all common tasks appropriate for their grade.
2. Leaders must understand the fundamentals of defense and use appropriate measures.
3. A review of **STP 21-1** would enhance a medical unit's ability to protect itself.
4. Review basic defensive perimeter techniques **in FM 5-34**, ***Engineer Field Data*** (preparation of obstacles and fighting positions and the effective use of limited engineer assets).

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Competing priorities

OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): A CSS soldier has to provide support while simultaneously working on base defense.

DISCUSSION: This requires a careful balance, and normally support gets more attention at the expense of base defense.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. CSS commanders need to realize that a good solid base defense is a force multiplier. Initially, base defense is going to require lots of manpower, but after the site has been completed, it will take fewer soldiers to maintain.

2. The base defense must be factored in to the service support equation. CSS units must have a plan and aggressively execute it shortly after occupation and prior to getting totally immersed in providing support. NCOs must ensure maximum use of available time prior to getting involved in mission support.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Reaction to NBC threats

OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): Most units lack a well-thought-out NBC plan.

DISCUSSION: When presented with an NBC threat, the chain of command falls apart and chaos ensues. A common problem is the lack of basic NBC knowledge and a plan that delineates actions to take on and after the attack (to include unmasking procedures).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **FM 3-4, *NBC Protection***, for specific information on NBC protection.

2. Chapters 2 and 3 of **FM 3-4** provide outstanding basic information to help thought and planning processes.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Force protection security

OBSERVATION (TF2): Leader involvement in the planning and execution of both offensive and defensive operations usually results in the failure of a company security plan.

DISCUSSION: Lack of application of a security plan during the movement-to-contact phase results in the unit being surprised in their patrol base and suffering numerous casualties. Lack of application of a security plan in the defense results in the unit being overwhelmed by a much smaller force.

1. Leaders often fail to clearly articulate the specific active and passive measures they want their company to undertake. Those that are published are usually not supervised to ensure enforcement.

2. Leaders fail to conduct company- or platoon-level IPB. Active measures, such as LP/OPs, stand-tos, and patrols, are not often enforced or conducted. When done, they are rarely executed as a result of the leader's IPB. The result is that LP/OPs are only 50 meters out and do not cover a likely avenue of approach, or patrols that are not dispatched to known areas of activity but rather areas of the least restrictive terrain.

3. Passive measures, such as the deployment of early warning systems, night-vision device usage (especially attached TOW assets) in the surveillance plan, and the siting of the company position, are rarely given much thought.

4. Units rarely dig hasty fighting positions in the offense (patrol bases).

5. Leaders often fail to site-in key weapons systems.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders must conduct IPB at their level.

2. Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) should give junior leaders direction in the application of appropriate security measures, and leader supervision/enforcement will ensure proper execution.

3. Review **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company***, Chapters 4 and 5.

4. Reference **CALL Handbook No. 96-3, *Own the Night*.**

(TA.6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Maintenance

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Troop-level maintenance is strong.

DISCUSSION: Scheduling services to best support key missions is being conducted.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Ensure scheduled services are conducted.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Maintenance skills

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Soldiers at the JRTC display a superior knowledge of aircraft maintenance skills.

DISCUSSION: Aircraft mechanics demonstrate the ability to perform both real world and notional repairs in a tactical environment. Additionally, AVUM units have made great strides in planning for deployment.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Most maintenance slices now deploy with the appropriate tools, test equipment, and repair parts to support 40 or more aircraft.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

<u>TREND 3</u>
SUBJECT: Vehicle maintenance and sustainment operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Vehicle maintenance and sustainment operations continue to be a positive trend.

DISCUSSION: The success of vehicle maintenance operations can be attributed in part to platoons bringing their organic mechanics to JRTC. Sustainment operations continue to be a positive trend at the JRTC. From prior coordination before the deployment to operational sustainment during the rotation, the platoon sergeant shoulders the bulk of the sustainment operation to include not only all classes of supply but also personnel.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The success of the operational readiness (OR) rates can be attributed to the platoon sergeant's knowledge of the supply and replacement system and rapport with the supported brigade.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Casualty operations (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Casualty evacuation operations at the JRTC were a positive trend.

DISCUSSION: The success of CASEVAC can be attributed in part to the high concentration of combat lifesavers within the platoons. In addition to the combat lifesavers, the platoons are bringing platoon medics who are highly skilled and respected by their platoons.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Maintain the level of medical training in the unit and ensure a high number of combat lifesavers.

(TA.7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Crew protection

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Crew coordination is clearly an active program in the field.

DISCUSSION: This continues to prove a major risk reduction tool and an integral part of accident avoidance at the JRTC.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue Home Station training to reinforce crew training and expertise.

(TA.7.4.5 Train Tactical Unit and Personnel)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Aerial resupply plan

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The forward support battalion (FSB) support operations officer (SOO) deploys to the JRTC with a well-thought-out aerial resupply plan.

DISCUSSION: The plan properly echelons supplies in order to support the brigade's maneuver plan. The SOO and the brigade S4 work together to respond to customer needs and to changing tactical plans. The brigade S-4 and the FSB SOO are doing a good job at both planning and executing support for the defense. The use of combat configured loads (CCLs) of Class IV/V (mines) results in timely and accurate distribution to engineer supply points and company-sized battle positions.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task-organizing palletized loading systems (PLS) and material handling equipment (MHE) to the infantry battalions has effectively increased the brigade's logistical posture while preparing for the defense.

2. It is helpful when a concept of support sketch and timeline is included in the brigade's operations order.

3. The timing of the CSS rehearsal for the defense is critical. Often units are waiting too late to conduct the rehearsal -- in some cases within 12 hours prior to the "defend no later than" time. Units should conduct the rehearsal about 48 hours prior to the "defend NLT" time.

(TA.7.5.1.2.2 Move by Air)

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Ammunition transfer point (ATP) operations

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The ATP does exceptionally well when the division ammunition officer (DAO) representative is collocated with the ATP.

DISCUSSION: The DAO representative focuses on the receipt and processing of DA Form 581 in a timely manner.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The ATP NCOIC can focus on operating and managing the ATP and provide quality service to the customer.

(TA.7.5.2 x3 Supply the Force Munitions)

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Class V sustainment

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Sustainment continues to be a strength for air defense batteries.

DISCUSSION: At Home Station, leaders, especially first sergeants and platoon sergeants, are integrating with BDE/TF S4s and support platoon leaders to develop LOGPAC procedures prior to deployment. This facilitates ease of missile requisition and distribution. During the planning process, leaders incorporate missile requisition and distribution into their overall plans.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. ADA leaders develop timelines and schedules to ensure missiles are in the hands of fire units when and where they need them.

2. When missile requisitions are delayed, platoon sergeants should have good cross-leveling plans to redistribute missiles where needed on the battlefield.

(TA.7.5.2 x3 Supply the Force Munitions)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Casualty evacuation planning

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Many CSS units do not have a plan to evacuate casualties.

DISCUSSION: A large majority of CSS units view casualty evacuation as a simple process that can be developed and executed while casualties are happening. Most do not analyze and fail to realize what it takes to properly render assistance and effectively remove casualties from the battlefield. CSS units typically do not understand that casualty evacuation will use resources normally used for other purposes and fail to incorporate them into the plan. Those units that do have a plan tend not to rehearse it, and during execution it proves to be non-effective.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders need to emphasize casualty evacuation. Casualty evacuation has to be part of the base operations plan and all mission support plans.
2. Transportation is one of the most critical commodities for CSS units and, as such, must be managed. The use of these assets must be factored in to the overall plan so that they are available when needed. The plan must then be rehearsed in order to be successful.
3. Units should look at **FM 8-10-6*, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations***, for guidance on planning casualty evacuation.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Litter teams

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Expeditious loading and evacuation of casualties is the single most important element in reducing the number of died of wounds (DOW) on the battlefield today. Units fail to recognize that medical personnel alone cannot accomplish this mission.

DISCUSSION: Although the use of non-standard evacuation platforms is increasingly being employed, litter teams are still slowing the process of evacuation. Units are failing to augment teams with non-medical personnel or failing to adequately train team members so that evacuation platforms can be rapidly loaded and unloaded.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders need to emphasize that patient evacuation is not strictly a medical mission, but rather a unit mission. Non-medical litter bearers are a force multiplier for the combat medic. Medical personnel should be used to supervise litter teams, but their expertise is better put to use in the treatment of casualties than in the actual carrying of litters.
2. All unit personnel should be trained in litter team techniques, and rotating rosters should be established to have personnel on call for litter team duty.

3. Units can train on the proper techniques for litter teams by using **FM 21-11, *First Aid for Soldiers*.**

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Field sanitation

OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): Historically, battlefield losses to disease non-battle injuries (DNBI) significantly exceed those of injuries incurred in battle. Because of this, field sanitation measures are still one of the most critical elements of combat operations today.

DISCUSSION: Units routinely fail to leave proper distances between latrines and food service facilities and fail to establish hand-washing facilities in an expeditious manner.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Field sanitation measures need to be enforced from the first day of an operation.
2. Units should review **FM 8-250, *Preventive Medicine Specialist;* FM 21-10, *Field Hygiene and Sanitation;*** and **FM 21-10-1, *Unit Field Sanitation Team.***

(TA.7.4.4.3 Provide Preventative Medicine)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Aviation employment in CSS

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The aviation task forces typically find themselves underemployed from a combat service support (CSS) standpoint during most JRTC rotations.

DISCUSSION: The aviation task force usually has 15 or so UH-60s and at least 4 CH-47s in addition to the number of attack or reconnaissance aircraft. With the exception of several large-scale air movement or assault missions, these assets spend a majority of their time "standing by for CASEVAC" or other 911 missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue to reinforce this training at Home Station.

(TA.7.5.1.2.2 Move by Air)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Methods of air movement on CSS

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Other efficiencies may be realized from adopting the shuttle method, a simple though effective method for managing air movement of CSS.

DISCUSSION: During the defense, air movement priorities are usually to Class IV and V. Aircraft typically return empty from a mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Crews, for example, should briefed to stop at the casualty collection point before returning to the brigade support area (BSA).
2. Many items may be retrograded quickly and safely by this method if proper planning and coordination have been conducted.

(TA.7.5.1.2.2 Move by Air)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Priorities for movement

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units do a poor job of prioritizing supplies for movement.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. In the JRTC environment, recommend the brigade S-4 establish the priorities for movement by class of supply and by unit (with the commander's concurrence).
2. Once the priorities for use of utility and medium-lift assets are established, the aviation LNO builds an air movement table in coordination with the SPO. This table is distributed to the units and updated twice daily.
3. If weather or maintenance should interfere with scheduled deliveries, the S-4 may need to adjust unit priorities accordingly.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Priorities for movement

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): All too often the unit has a great plan on D-Day, but the enemy can always counter any good plan.

DISCUSSION: By day three or four, the plan is lost and units are too busy manning the perimeter to rescue the CSS effort. At this point the infantry is running out of water, food, ammo, and patience.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: It is all about planning, coordination, and modifying the plan as conditions change.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Health service logistics

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Units lack the ability to use the Theater Army Medical Management Information System (TAMMIS).

DISCUSSION: This results in a several day lag time for operational input which is often impossible to make up. Medical supplies often reach critical stockage levels because clinical staff and medical supply personnel fail to coordinate efforts.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Clinical staff members need to be familiar with the UAL and type of equipment on-hand for the hospital. This must be done at Home Station as part of the yearly training calendar.

2. Training should include both Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS) and permanent party personnel. Once deployed, medical logistics personnel need to circulate through wards to check on supply levels, and clinical personnel need to gain a better understanding of the time necessary to obtain supplies through the normal requisitioning system.

(TA.7.5.2.5 Store Supplies)

TREND 9

SUBJECT: Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Many units have experienced problems with EPW operations.

DISCUSSION: The problems result from a failure to develop an EPW annex or place pertinent critical information in the coordinating instructions paragraph of the base order.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Due to limited MP assets, the brigade combat teams (BCTs) often do not require the MP platoon to conduct enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee operations. The result is that the MI company performs the mission assisted by the forward support battalion (FSB) and the brigade fails to provide the division with required information, logs, and status reports on EPW/CI.

2. Brigades do not maintain and forward the required forms for EPW/CI accountability. Military police must be involved in EPW/CI operations. If there are other operational requirements for the MP platoon, it is advisable to require at least MP supervision/counsel over the processing and reporting.

3. The platoons should enforce the guidelines for processing EPW/CI in accordance with company and division tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

4. Review **FM 19-4,** ***Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations;*** and **STP 19-95B1-SM** (task no. 191-376-4101).

5. There is a need to develop a BCT contingency EPW support package that provides tentage, survivability items, and sundry packs for EPWs as well as detained civilians. BCTs should also place the construction of the EPW cage on the BSA execution matrix to ensure proper focus and priority. There is a great need for training within the BCTs on the proper handling, searching, and tagging of EPWs.

(TA.7.7.1 Perform PW Operations)

TREND 10

SUBJECT: Civilians on the battlefield

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Units seldom include viable plans for dealing with civilians on the battlefield, a constant problem for deployed CSS units.

DISCUSSION: Every deployment includes lessons learned regarding the number of civilians with which CSS units must interact. A constant flow of refugees, homeless people, workers, thieves, sick and wounded, etc., will assemble at the gates of CSS units hoping for assistance in some form. At the JRTC, however, corps-level units often enclose themselves within their own concertina prison and fail to take advantage of the information and assistance civilian officials can provide.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must be prepared to deal with the onslaught of civilians without damaging the relationship with the host nation.
2. Units must maintain a critical balance of force protection and civilian interface.
3. Units should re-look their plans and SOPs to determine ways to gain assistance (particularly intelligence) from locals while still maintaining protection for the force.
4. Units should review **CALL Newsletter No. 98-11**, ***Stability and Support Operations***, and **FM 7-98**, ***Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict***, Chapter 4, Peacekeeping.

(TA.7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area)

TREND 11

SUBJECT: Civilians on the battlefield

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Most units are unfamiliar/untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: This ranges from unnecessary use/display of force, to permitting civilians free access to the position area and allowing them to disrupt unit activities. Another common occurrence is for the unit to call the battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Frequently, the battalion takes an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with the civilians. The result is unnecessarily angering friendly/neutral civilians or allowing neutral/anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C2 nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.). Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section by a detonated rucksack or car bomb.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians and clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian, as well as those civilians not on any list.
2. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians. Train and rehearse all soldiers on how to deal with COBs at Home Station.

(TA.7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) maintenance

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Communications-electronics (C-E) and vehicle maintenance continue to improve within the MSE units.

DISCUSSION: Leaders have a clear understanding of MSE-peculiar maintenance and supply concepts as outlined in Chapter 6 of **TM 11-5800-216-10-1**, Appendix L of **TM 11-5800-216-10-4**, and task no. 43-2-C323 of **ARTEP 11-067-30-MTP**.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Operator maintenance is in accordance with the applicable Technical Manual and task no. 43-2-C322 of **ARTEP 11-067-30-MTP**.
2. C-E maintenance teams have matured along with the signal equipment. Many of the junior and senior C-E NCOs have been working with MSE for 5 or 10 years now, and this experience has proven to be invaluable in diagnostics and troubleshooting.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Tactical communications

OBSERVATION (TF 3): Units participating in the CPX simulation usually make effective use of tactical communications.

DISCUSSION: The tactical operations center (TOC) and company commanders are in constant contact via FM radio. Success is based on the close proximity of personnel to the radios, which in turn leads to good communication monitoring.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units need to train RTOs and rotate personnel on the radios to maintain alertness and remain successful.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Company command post (CP) operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Heavy teams have improved company (or troop) command post operations.

DISCUSSION: This includes providing the necessary material (shelter, radios, map board, etc.) and personnel to conduct 24-hour operations. The command post is especially critical during the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase because of decentralized operations with the platoons/sections.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 2 above.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Field artillery CSS decision-making

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): The field artillery decision-making process results in the production of a quality Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP).

DISCUSSION: The Military Decision-Making Process is being followed and is producing informative Field Artillery Support Plans (FASP). Good integration of staff elements are resulting in a detailed orders process.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Use of a matrix type of order is the preferred method.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: S-2 and analysis control team (ACT) integration

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Every unit integrated the MI company ACT into their brigade tactical operations center (TOC) tent.

DISCUSSION: This brought additional analysts into the brigade TOC to help the brigade S-2 section track and analyze the enemy, plus it brought additional connectivity into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) intelligence architecture. One unit chose to under resource their ACT with only one second lieutenant and two privates. This unit was consistently unable to analyze information coming from organic MI company assets and did not access the ASAS intelligence architecture at all. The remainder of the units resourced their ACTs and were able to reap significant benefits.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During Home Station training, S-2s need to train themselves and their sections using a series of terrain walks, map studies, and historical case studies.

2. S-2s need to develop a keen sense of how the terrain will affect their unit. There are ample opportunities for the S-2 to leave the TOC and see the ground. For example, during the defense, while the battalion commander troops the line from the left flank, the battalion S-2 can walk it from the right flank. As he moves from right to left, he can adjust his analysis and also brief all the platoons on what he expects them to face in their sector.

3. S-2s must focus the terrain portion of their mission analysis brief on the results of their analysis; that is, the effects of the terrain on friendly and enemy forces as well as identification of key and decisive terrain.

4. Most commanders do not need to see all the terrain factors in extensive detail; however, they do need to receive the S-2s analysis.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Motivation and flexibility of the Military Police platoons

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): The majority of the platoons possessed a tremendously positive attitude and desire to learn and practice new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as well as develop new platoon standing operating procedures (SOPs).

DISCUSSION: Military police (MP) platoons demonstrated an incredible amount of flexibility and ability to accomplish missions.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue to train the MPs at Home Station for anticipated contingencies they may face when deployed.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Mission planning

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Mission planning at the aviation company level is especially noteworthy.

DISCUSSION: Assault crews consistently show considerable determination towards in-depth planning and mission accomplishment regardless of time available and limited information from higher headquarters.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Continue to reinforce Home Station training in planning and in the Military Decision-Making Process.

2. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12,** ***Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning" Update,*** May 97.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans and Orders)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Firing battery movement order

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed in accordance with (IAW) the XO's handbook, addressing specific and implied tasks.

DISCUSSION: Battery leaders brief movement routes, utilizing start points, check points, and release points. When higher headquarters do not issue start points, check points and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own, facilitating movement command and control.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 7 above.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans and Orders)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Production of NBC orders and rehearsals

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Brigade chemical cells continue to produce sound NBC annexes where there once were none, and brigade chemical officers now conduct NBC rehearsals during the brigade Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION: NBC annexes are key to ensuring the sound integration of NBC assets and synchronizing the brigade as well as battalion NBC fights. NBC rehearsals at brigade level are critical in order for all units to understand how the NBC assets are integrated and synchronized into the brigade mission and unit responsibilities in case of NBC attacks.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 3-7*, NBC Field Handbook,*** is a good reference, and many of the successful units are using it as a basis for their NBC annexes.
2. **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations,*** Appendix G, gives the definition and responsibilities for the conduct of rehearsals.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans and Orders)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Doctrinal terminology

OBSERVATION (C2 EAD): The medical task force staff and subordinate leaders often cannot define or describe military terms used routinely in the war fight.

DISCUSSION: Medical units often do not understand the significance of task organization changes when defined in terms of assigned, attached, OPCON, TACON, etc. These terms provide critical command and control relationships that give commanders both specified and implied requirements in relation to those units. Seldom do corps-level units use backbrief methods to ensure subordinate leaders understand the message that was conveyed.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The backbrief is important – use it! The backbrief clarifies instructions which reduce confusion and increase clarity.

2. Leaders must understand that words mean different things to different people based on background, experience, and setting. For example, the term "secure the building" has entirely different meanings for a policeman, an infantry oficer, and a real estate agent.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans and Orders)

TREND 11

SUBJECT: Integration and synchronization of the brigade operations law team (BOLT) with the brigade staff

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SJA): Training with units enhanced the skills of the legal team operating as members of the brigade staff. The tracking and managing of these actions has improved greatly.

DISCUSSION: The brigade operations law teams (BOLTs) are faced with numerous legal significant actions (SIGACT) during deployment. Information management becomes more important with each additional legal SIGACT.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The brigade operations law teams are participating in field exercises at Home Station.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Use of the chemical officer

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): In many rotational units at both brigade and battalion level, the chemical officer is used as a battle captain or plans officer and the NCO is used as a TOC NCO or RTO (or a combination of other duties instead of NBC duties).

DISCUSSION: In the initial phase of operations this is acceptable, but as the NBC threat escalates, a transition must occur. Chemical personnel must be allowed to execute their duties as the brigade or battalion's NBC expert. Calling chemical personnel after an attack is too late. The major shortfall is that chemical personnel have not been allowed the time that other battle staff members have been allowed to plan, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the NBC effort.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Brigade and battalion commanders must remain sensitive to the unique perspective that the chemical officer brings to the fight and give him the proper amount of time to develop the NBC effort.

2. Review **FM 100-5*, Operations***, and **FM 3-100*, Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals.*** They both outline chemical duties and responsibilities.

(TA.4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Use of off-the-shelf handheld radios

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): This communication technique is vulnerable to compromise while not guaranteeing receipt of messages within the chain of command.

DISCUSSION: Typically, units bring a multitude of Motorola handheld radios for their leaders. While information can be relayed quickly to a lot of people at remote locations, units tend to rely too heavily on radios as their primary means of internal communications. Two major problems are noted with this method.

1. Handheld radios are normally non-secure. Inexpensive scanners available at Radio Shack provide a simple method of compromising information passed via handhelds.

2. Units often draw a bad assumption that information passed as a net call is received by everyone holding a radio.

Units seldom exercise the chain of command to disseminate information to the lowest level. Consequently, critical information is held in pockets within the organization assuming it has been dispersed throughout the unit. Simple questions such as "What country are you in?," "Who are you fighting?," and "What does the enemy's uniforms look like?" are often met with blank stares. While handheld radios have their place, units must not make grand assumptions about their usefulness within a compound.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must avoid reliance on non-secure means of communications within the compound because of the risk of compromise and the tendency to avoid the chain of command as the conduit for information flow. Daily routine information should be transmitted via TA-312 or DNVT and through the chain of command.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Aviation liaison team communication

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Internal communications via aviation liaision teams is usually poorly done.

DISCUSSION: Aviation liaison teams are usually not staffed for 24-hour operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. In the JRTC environment, in an infantry brigade task force, the aviation LNO, at a minimum, should consist of a four-man team – two officers (commissioned or warrant) and two SPC/SGT, MOS 93P.

2. The liaison team should be equipped with a vehicle, dual-net SINCGARS, and UHF capability. They must have access to the TACLAN and, of course, a mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phone.

3. This team would have the capability to function 24 hours a day, conduct split operations if the TAC deploys, and maintain the capability to conduct face-to-face coordination with the aviation task force and subordinate ground units when required.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Information management

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): **Brigade aviation LNOs have trouble keeping the brigade staff current about aviation task force specifics (i.e., aircraft maintenance status, crew cycle/availability, FARP locations/status, mission status, aviation unit locations, etc.)**.

DISCUSSION: This is due to many factors, including lack of personnel to man the aviation LNO section for 24-hour operations, fog of war, and the absence of established reporting procedures in unit TACSOPs regarding aviation operations. In addition, many aviation task force staffs funnel an inordinate amount of information through the LNO that more appropriately should be passed from staff to staff using established reporting procedures.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should establish a formal reporting format for more routine information, and require the subordinate aviation task forces to pass tactical information through normal channels, such as the subordinate maneuver units, as opposed to using the aviation LNO as the primary contact at brigade. This will, in turn, free the LNO to assist in mission planning and coordination with the brigade staff.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: NBC warning and reporting

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Repeatedly, warning and reporting systems in rotational units are dysfunctional.

DISCUSSION: During chemical attacks it takes one or more hours to receive the initial NBC report with any type of useable information. Chemical personnel often delay taking any action until this report is received.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The key is, don't delay reporting. If the chemical officer has conducted a thorough IPB and a strike has occurred in a templated area, he can then start taking action in response to the attack.

2. One tool that assists tactical operations centers (TOCs) and chemical personnel in dealing with chemical attacks is the "battle drill." This provides focus for everyone in the TOC and causes a preselected number of actions to be executed with the chemical officer being the

center of focus. One condition of the battle drill is the submission of an NBC 1 report to higher headquarters. The NBC 1 report will provide the chemical officer the necessary information to identify the hazard that confronts him.

3. **FMs 3-7*, NBC Field Handbook,*** and **FM 3-3*, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance***, are two manuals that address the required information for a good NBC 1 report.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Communications in the tactical operations center (TOC)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Brigade and battalion S-6 officers focus on communications in the TOC and not on overall communications for their respective element.

DISCUSSION: Many maneuver S-6s have allowed themselves to become the TOC communications officers, focusing only on installing and troubleshooting equipment, and do not fulfill their doctrinal duties and responsibilities to the commander, staff, and subordinate elements. This leads to poor planning, coordination, and synchronization, and poor execution of signal aspects in support of the unit's mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The duties and responsibilities of the S-6 are defined in **FM 11-43*, Signal Leader's Guide***, and **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations***.

2. The S-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning signal operations, automation management, network management, and information security across the task force. In accordance with **FM 11-43**, the communications chief (NCO) should be responsible for maintaining and troubleshooting communications at the TOC, leaving the S-6 free to recognize and anticipate battlefield activities.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Transmission of information at the tactical operations center (TOC) for medical units

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Units have a hard time relaying information within a unit.

DISCUSSION: Typically, EAD medical units coordinate with the supported brigade during initial planning and while the unit is staged in the ISB. Once deployed into the maneuver area, however, little communication takes place between division and corps-level troops. This shortfall results in poor planning for support, inefficient use of assets across the battlefield, and a high died-of-wounds rate.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must consistently communicate with supported units and consistently share information between units.

2. Corps-level units may want to place an LNO at the brigade TOC to ensure both mission requirements and planning factors are relayed. If all else fails, the myriad of vehicles (air and ground) that move throughout the battlefield can provide courier service between critical nodes.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Battle-tracking

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Corps staffs fail to share information or include supporting elements in the planning process.

DISCUSSION: Seldom do corps-level units follow up with the maneuver brigade in terms of battle-tracking once the brigade leaves the ISB. Because of the non-secure LOCs, OPTEMPO of the exercise, and difficulty in obtaining and maintaining clear communications, units put communications with adjacent and supported units in the "too hard to do" category and assume the missions are going as planned in the initial meetings. Consequently, requirements change without the knowledge of those that must support the mission. Corps units are unaware of threats such as minefields, enemy locations, and assets that will significantly disrupt the unit's ability to support the maneuver force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 7 above.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Information flow and management

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Battle-tracking in the various command posts is insufficient.

DISCUSSION: Friendly unit locations are not normally updated and disseminated to subordinate companies. Units habitually file critical information without any analysis or dissemination. Most often the reason for this is the lack of a tactical operations center standing operating procedure (TOCSOP) or the failure to follow an already existing SOP.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must develop systems for battle-tracking in the TOCSOP and properly train their battle captains and NCOs in using these critical documents.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Aviation element liaison activities

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units do not allocate the proper assets or understand the duties of liaisons (LNOs).

DISCUSSION: Brigades economize on the aviation LNO because they misunderstand his duties or have low expectations of his contributions. In many cases, there is not enough room in the TOC for the LNO.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The aviation task force must ensure adequate 24-hour representation. What does it take to resource and train this team and what will you get for your efforts?

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Resourcing and use of aviation liaison officers (LNOs)

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units do not augment their planning efforts.

DISCUSSION: During particularly large missions such as battalion air assaults, the aviation task force must further augment with a planning cell direct to the supported unit to assist in the development/refinement of the air assault. Placing the LNO in that role removes him from other future planning efforts and current operations management.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 10 above.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: LNO use

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The aviation LNO is not being used properly.

DISCUSSION: The LNO represents a key advisor to the commander. He should be from where the fight is managed -- the TOC or TAC. He must have unrestricted access to the aviation task force commander, and regular updates should be scheduled in advance.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Properly resourced, trained, and employed, the LNO represents the most versatile aspect of maneuver -- the aviation task force.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Brigade-level planning of aviation support for CSS operations

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The principal CSS planner in the brigade task force is the brigade S-4, who too often fails to sufficiently coordinate with aviation LNOs.

DISCUSSION: The S-4 is usually assisted by the aviation LNO and the support operations officer (SPO) at the forward support battalion/main support battalion (FSB/MSB). At the JRTC, this entire responsibility is often delegated to the FSB/MSB commander and his SPO. Unfortunately in these cases, the loss in coordination and synchronization across all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) results in little CSS moved by air.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S-4 should be the primary planner for support operations, and he should use the LNOs to focus on using all air assets available in the resupply and support role.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Army airspace command and control (A2C2) responsibilities

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The brigade A2C2 elements rarely function doctrinally.

DISCUSSION: The S-3 (Air), the chief airspace manager for the brigade, normally does not synchronize all elements and users of brigade airspace: ADA weapons control status, ADA/FA battery locations, flight routes, CAS and airlift mission schedules/routes, and rotary-wing missions. The preponderance of airspace management and air mission requests is relegated to the brigade aviation LNO. Subsequently, the lack of synchronization routinely results in fratricides and airspace conflicts.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade must formally establish the A2C2 element and ensure the S-3 (Air) is firmly in charge.
2. Establishing the A2C2 element in its entirety prior to deployment to the JRTC is often difficult due to the geographic separation of sister service elements (e.g., ALOs and ANGLICOs). The key is putting the S-3 (Air) back in charge of airspace management instead of focusing him on deployment issues and joint inspections (JI).

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Aviation company command post (CP) battle-tracking

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation company command posts are a major hurdle for company-level units.

DISCUSSION:

1. Very little battle-tracking or updating of friendly/enemy situations occurs in company CPs. This results in aircrews departing with outdated information.
2. Most companies have systems in place to facilitate these functions, yet, with the exception of large-scale air assaults, they fail to update them.
3. Units rarely track missions at the company level and only infrequently track aircraft diverted to follow-on missions or in-flight mission changes. Contributing to the general disorganization of most company CPs is the choice of personnel to work in the CP.
4. Personnel are often chosen simply due to availability or by rotational basis rather than by qualification and training.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Personnel should be selected for duty in the company CP based on their performance and training at Home Station to a standard that will reinforce success.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: MEDEVAC work cell

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The forward support medical team (FSMT) is not fully integrated into planning, battle-tracking, and communications.

DISCUSSION: MEDEVAC units need to place an operational work cell in the aviation tactical operations center (TOC) when collocated with the aviation task force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The forward support medical team (FSMT) work cell needs to track mission graphics, frequencies, aircraft status, and number of patients moved.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Battery and battalion command post (CP) operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Battery and platoon CP crews are untrained prior to deployment. The tactical operations center (TOC) crews do not understand their duties and responsibilities within the TOC and the role they play in fighting the current or future fight.

DISCUSSION: TOC crews do not have the information/battle-tracking tools necessary to manage the vast amount of information within brigade and task force TOCs. More importantly, they have difficulty analyzing the information, developing a course of action, and disseminating the information to their subordinates and fire units. Task force air defense officers (ADOs) are not integrated with their supported units. They have difficulty communicating with the staff and sharing information because most platoon leaders (PLs) are remoted into TOCs from their command vehicle. When operating from their vehicles, PLs miss an enormous amount of information. Most critical to situational awareness are information management, analysis, and dissemination. PLs cannot clear fires, routes, and obstacles for moving fire units and relay current battle information by sitting inside their vehicles. Battle-tracking is lost because TOC crews do not have the tools necessary to operate.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. ADOs should understand the importance of establishing a battle rhythm. This affects their ability to plan, command and control, and execute the current fight.
2. Radio telephone operators (RTOs) are not effectively used. RTOs are used strictly as drivers, yet they can contribute a great deal to command and control if trained properly.

3. Platoon sergeants (PSGs) must be used to assist platoon leaders. PSGs should remain situationally aware of platoon and task force operations.

4. TOC charts, journals, and message transmittal forms need to be organized, updated, and used to analyze situations and disseminate critical information to fire units.

5. TOCs must facilitate information management, analysis, and dissemination. Train RTOs and PSGs in basic TOC operations to achieve situational awareness and facilitate command and control. Conduct exercises (TOCEXs) that stress battle-tracking techniques and procedures to achieve crew efficiency. TOCs should develop scenarios that include alternate CPs taking over the current battle.

6. Develop a TOC SOP that outlines each soldier's duties and responsibilities, and cross-train to provide redundancy. Develop a battery/platoon battle rhythm that allows ADA leaders to be at critical planning meetings, and allow them to position themselves on the battlefield where they can command and control efficiently.

7. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, *TOC Operations***, for ideas on how to organize a TOC or CP and on what kind of functional charts and tools can be used.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Situational awareness

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Many maneuver platoons experienced difficulty with situational awareness because they did not have a system in place to properly battle-track and manage information.

DISCUSSION: Battle-tracking in platoon command posts was not to the resolution necessary to provide squad leaders with visibility of enemy locations, friendly unit dispositions, and the current status of combat operations throughout the battlefield. Inversely, squad leaders rarely provided route or area reconnaissance overlays and did not report information in a manner that "painted a picture" for the platoon leaders. During operations, the platoons did not always use control measures (e.g., phase lines, checkpoints, or rally points) to internally track progress or did not report locations to their higher command and control element.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The platoons must provide the bridgade combat team (BCT) with the information necessary to have resolution of location, current status, and missions of the MP units on the battlefield.

2. The platoons should be considered during the BCT's clearance of fires drills.

3. The platoon command post must track the current brigade operation to the resolution necessary to provide squad leaders with information to plan and conduct operations and prevent fratricide. The platoon command post must also disseminate and provide feedback on the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIR).

4. Platoon leaders must require squad leaders to submit timely situation reports (SITREPs) and route reconnaissance reports.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Reserve component staffs

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Reserve component corps support groups and corps support battalion staffs are not, for the most part, familiar with battle-tracking and how this process, in conjunction with asset visibility, can enhance customer support.

DISCUSSION: Most staffs have trouble assimilating and translating intelligence and operational products into valuable information that can assist in anticipating requirements. The support operations section, if working properly, will track all assets provided by the companies.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S-2 will provide the latest intelligence on the threat and what impact threat actions can have on the unit and its ability to support.
2. The S-3 will provide the latest update reflecting the supported customer's next operation. When combined and analyzed, these elements will provide enough information on current requirements, possible future requirements, and assets on hand to satisfy those requirements. This will enable the unit to anticipate and be proactive versus reactive.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: Medical staff battle-tracking

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Failure to track events causes decreased situational awareness, a key component for survival on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: Few medical staffs have any expertise in tracking and analyzing events to discover trends that may indicate pending hostile actions against the unit. Simple analyses may show hostile forces approaching from the same direction or the same general time and allow the unit to take additional protective measures against the threat.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Soldiers must learn all common tasks appropriate for their grade.
2. Leaders must understand the fundamentals of defense and use appropriate measures to protect facilities.
3. A review of **STP 21-1** would greatly enhance a medical unit's ability to protect itself against a threat.
4. A review of basic defensive perimeter techniques in **FM 5-34**, ***Engineer Field Data,*** would assist in the preparation of obstacles and fighting positions and in the effective use of limited engineer assets.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 21
SUBJECT: Mission tracking

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): One of the most challenging aspects of logistical support is to track each mission from beginning to completion.

DISCUSSION: Many support operations shops have the basic tools for mission tracking displayed, but seldom use them properly. After the first few missions, tracking fades into only following those missions that are yet to SP. The section needs to have visibility of all missions. The biggest problem is the mission close-out. The company accomplishing the mission seldom closes the loop with the support operations section. Without closure, the support operations section will not have a good picture of what assets are available for future missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A solution is to have a trip ticket that the driver can fill in after returning which the company forwards to the support operations section. The support operations section can then update their boards with the correct information.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 22
SUBJECT: Tracking friendly unit positions

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Maneuver battalions are consistently unable to keep track of all the friendly units operating in their zone.

DISCUSSION: Although the TOC generally has a good view of where its organic subordinates are on the battlefield, it often lacks awareness of brigade or division forces deployed within the battalion's boundaries. This leads to clearance of fires problems and increases the probability of fratricide.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The solution comes in two parts.

1. Battalion TOCs must be proficient in battle-tracking techniques. Specific techniques are discussed in **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7*, Tactical Operations Center (TOC),*** May 95.
2. Brigades should not assign units missions within battalion sectors without designating a command relationship or issuing specific coordinating instructions. For example, the brigade ADA officer wants to employ an avenger in a battalion sector in order to cover a likely enemy avenue of approach. The often seen but usually unsuccessful technique is for the ADA company commander to keep the avenger under brigade control and position the asset in sector without coordination. A more effective technique would be to task-organize the avenger to the battalion and give the battalion the specified task to subordinate units of denying the air avenue of approach. This method achieves both the desired tactical effect and forces the appropriate coordination.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 23
SUBJECT: Setting the conditions – battalion command and control (C2)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Maneuver battle staffs do not conduct detailed analysis (IPB or mission analysis) and fail to see the terrain or decisive point in a battle.

DISCUSSION:

1. The XO and S-3 do not adequately involve the S-2, FSO, or engineer officer in the troop-leading procedures.
2. Staffs do not understand the capabilities and limitations of non-organic assets such as mech/armor, attack aviation, AT, and engineers.
3. Units do not understand how to conduct backbriefs and rehearsals.
4. Unit combat multipliers are not integrated or synchronized at the decisive point and time.
5. Staffs do not have adequate battle drills and SOPs to facilitate efficient TLPs.

Staff teamwork is not enforced. The XO is not forceful enough in requiring the staff members to work together and integrate all their products. Staffs lack knowledge and internalization of the orders process.

6. Staffs commonly fail to identify the decisive points and fail to nest the tasks and purposes of the subordinate units to the decisive points.
7. Commanders fail to enforce the linkage between their intent and the concept of the operation. As a result, subordinate units execute missions without a clear vision of the operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Train all staff elements to do their own IPB.
2. Conduct frequent orders drills with all primary staff members.
3. Use the concept sketch as per doctrine when briefing the concept of the operation (a picture is worth a thousand words).
4. The battalion XO must enforce strict timelines and standards of work during the TLPs. Be, Know, Do **(FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations)***.
5. Conduct regular Home Station officer professional development (OPD) and staff training on the orders process.
6. Develop SOPs on how to set up a rehearsal site, who will brief/execute, and what will be briefed.

(TA.4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)

TREND 24
SUBJECT: Aviation task integration

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Maneuver task force battle staffs lack proficiency in planning for the doctrinal employment of aviation assets not assigned to the unit.

DISCUSSION: Attack battalions have difficulty in employing assault and heavy lift assets and vice versa.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Two fixes to this difficult problem are Home Station training and the use of aviation LNOs. Commanders must ensure their staff officers, including the LNOs, are intimately familiar with all aviation doctrinal references, not just attack or cavalry or assault employment.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 25
SUBJECT: Use of aviation liaison officers and cells

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Brigade task force organizations training at the JRTC economize on one of the most versatile staff officers in their TOC/TAC - the aviation task force LNO.

DISCUSSION: Granted, the parent aviation headquarters has the responsibility to be represented at the higher headquarters, but what is often seen at the JRTC is a junior captain or first lieutenant, often only one deep, with limited experience, expected to perform duties beyond his experience and education level. The result is inefficient planning and coordination and often aborted missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Put experienced officers with extensive experience in the liaison role to benefit everyone in planning and preparation. Otherwise, conduct Home Station training to provide liaison experience for junior officers.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 26
SUBJECT: Utilization of aviation assets

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Due to inexperience of the aviation liaison, many units do not properly use aviation assets.

DISCUSSION: The aviation LNO will advise the brigade commander on the use of aviation assets within his task force (attack, assault, medium lift, and EW). Additionally, he can coordinate for other aviation assets (external to the TF) and assist in integrating them into the fight. He typically manages A2C2 for the brigade and assists in the management of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC assets. He performs "911" liaison with the aviation task force when standby aircraft are needed, and assumes staff responsibility for aviation risk management.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The liaison must be prepared to advise the commander on interpretations of weather, fighter management, maintenance, and tactical employment of the aviation task force.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 27
SUBJECT: Collocation and shared responsibilities of A2C2

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): An efficiency to be considered at the brigade level is the collocation and shared responsibilities of A2C2 by the aviation LNO cell and the ADA cell.

DISCUSSION: Both cells must remain vigilant in airspace management and, along with the tactical command post (TACP) and the field artillery (FA) cells, must ensure accurate tracks on their respective systems to avoid fratricide or worse.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The sharing of the A2C2 function and collocation of these two cells worked effectively in several of the brigade task force organizations that trained at the JRTC.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 28
SUBJECT: Aviation integration in mission planning

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation assets must become involved in the infantry battalion's planning process early to affect a coordinated effort during the search and attack.

DISCUSSION: The aviation unit can do several things to facilitate the planning effort. Establishing command relationships ("OPCONing") is one method which forces involvement in the infantry's planning process. Sending liaisons (LNOs) to the infantry tactical operations center (TOC) is another method. The bottom line is that aviation units need to have the ground scheme of maneuver and graphics to affect a coordinated search and attack. The brigade targeting process begins 48 hours out, with orders going to infantry battalions 24 hours out. The infantry battalions should have targets planned for execution 12 hours prior to execution. The brigade LNOs have the responsibility to pass information from the targeting meeting to the aviation task force for future planning. The 24-hour "window" is where aviation integration in the planning process needs to occur at the battalion level. Knowing when the infantry will start point (SP), their target, their composition, and their movement plan to the target are basic elements aircrews need.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The aviation unit needs mirror supporting graphics, frequencies, and rehearsed battle drills.
2. Once the aviation unit has this information, it can plan "zone reconnaissance" to coincide with the infantry movement.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 29
SUBJECT: Air defense officer integration

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Air defense batteries experience difficulties in understanding and contributing to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION: Air defense officers (ADOs) develop the air portion of IPB without much detail and refinement. They do not integrate their products with the S-2's overall enemy situational and event templates. ADOs must aggressively integrate the enemy air event template with the S-2 to further refine the brigade's intelligence products. ADOs must understand threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations, and articulate this to commanders and staffs. ADOs do not understand their role in the targeting process. ADOs can use the enemy air situational and event templates to plan and fight the future brigade fight during the targeting process. ADOs have difficulty in synchronizing the air defense plan due to ineffective direction to platoon leaders and sporadic communications during execution. ADOs have difficulty integrating with the brigade's scheme of maneuver. This results in an ineffective task organization against the enemy air threat. These difficulties contribute to improper positioning of teams to gain early engagement, ineffective early warning planning, and ineffective command and control.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. ADOs must develop air defense priorities and allocate sufficient combat power to protect the brigade's high-value targets (HVTs) while simultaneously positioning teams along enemy air avenues of approach (AAA). There is very little visibility at the brigade level on how critical assets are protected. As a result, the enemy is able to conduct numerous air reconnaissance, resupply, and attack missions successfully.
2. Units should conduct leader training on the MDMP and on planning air defense operations.
3. Units should conduct leader training on the targeting process and the ADO's role in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) refinement and targeting.
4. Refer to **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operation***; **FM 44-100*, US Army Air Defense Operations***, specifically Appendix A, Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; and **FM 6-20-10*, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process*.**

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 30
SUBJECT: Route clearance

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Detailed route clearance planning at the brigade level is not being done.

DISCUSSION: Units need to put an effort into identifying routes, conducting threat analysis, and assigning appropriate command and control (C2) and task organization in order to execute a route clearance mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Appendix D of **FM 5-7-30*, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light),*** addresses mission analysis and planning considerations for route clearance.

2. CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-1, *Route Clearance Operations,* provides techniques for the employment of route clearance.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 31

SUBJECT: Integration of the heavy team into the scheme of maneuver

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The brigade often fails to integrate the heavy team into the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION: The most common result is the piecemealing of armor and mechanized forces across the battlefield, reacting to the enemy's success. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of experience light infantry brigades have with employing heavy forces.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: This is primarily due to the stationing of forces in CONUS and the difficulty in training together routinely. Units must maximize training opportunities to the fullest.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 32

SUBJECT: Use mass in determining the use of the heavy force

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The challenge to brigade staffs is to identify the decisive point to employ the heavy team in order to achieve massed effects.

DISCUSSION: When determining task organization, the brigade should be wary of dividing the heavy team below the platoon level. This is the basic maneuver unit of the heavy force and contains sufficient C2 to operate independently of the company.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade must ensure that it provides a valid task and purpose to the unit to conduct the mission.
2. The brigade must provide sufficient time for the subordinate elements to plan and rehearse. Because of the limited opportunities available to train with the heavy force prior to the rotation, this planning and rehearsal time becomes even more critical.
3. The integration of the heavy team liaison officer (LNO) into the brigade staff will enhance the brigade's success.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 33
SUBJECT: Forward logistics element (FLE) operations

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): FLE operations are failing to be a combat multiplier for light infantry brigades.

DISCUSSION: Typical weaknesses include:

1. No assigned task or purpose.
2. Not adequately integrating all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) or tactical logistics functions into the composition.
3. Lack of participation and/or attendance by key players for rehearsals.
4. Failure to follow an established standing operating procedure (SOP).
5. No clear C3.
6. FLE not on the brigade execution checklist.
7. Not integrating the brigade's organic logistics assets.
8. FLE not treated as a combat operation and often scheduled so late in the brigade's scheme of maneuver that it has little or no effect on the mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade S-4, S-1, and the FSB support operations officer must take the lead to resource the FLE properly and ensure that it is integrated into the brigade's scheme of maneuver.

2. Treat the FLE operation as a combat operation and integrate all BOS and tactical logistics functions into the composition.
3. Plan for a separate FLE rehearsal. Elevate the importance of the FLE in the MDMP and at the maneuver rehearsal.
4. Ensure the FLE is a brigade logistics node by integrating the brigade S-1/S-4 section into the operation.
5. **FM 63-1, *Support Battalions and Squadrons, Separate Brigades and Armored Cavalry Regiment***, Chapter 1, provides further tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as useful guidelines for this operation.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 34
SUBJECT: Staff coordination

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): **Staff coordination and integration of all task force elements are critical to accomplishment of the mission. At the outset of the operation, task force structure is often not well defined or understood by the C2 element or those units subordinate to the task force.**

DISCUSSION: Events such as MASF missions, battle damage assessment (BDA), logistical support, and internal tasking requirements often act as catalysts in forcing units to act as a single functional element rather than as a member of the task force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders need to project a team effort in order to aid the integration of all staff and task force elements prior to deployment.

2. A commander must set a battle rhythm that allows the staff to predict when he needs information, and then give the staff time to work together on a course of action.

3. Participating in the Leadership Training Program at Ft Polk is a valuable training tool to accomplish this.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 35

SUBJECT: Integration of medical clinical and administrative staffs

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Integration of clinical and administrative staffs is difficult. Because of a separation in function, information flow between the two elements is often limited.

DISCUSSION: Clinical staff personnel often fail to see the S-3 about what the maneuver units are doing in order to anticipate requirements, and are not always present during the daily updates. The S-3 will not usually take the opportunity to find out if there are any problems that would hinder the hospital in providing support. Clinical personnel are often not incorporated into operational planning and, therefore, cannot anticipate or forecast upcoming demands on the hospital system.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 35 above.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 36

SUBJECT: CSS units at corps level

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Corps-level CSS units routinely perform poorly in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION:

1. Staffs assume the process is for combat units and fail to see the utility of the process in estimating and executing their own support missions.

2. Courses of action are not wargamed or synchronized with the brigade's plans. Consequently, units consistently react to taskings rather than plan for support.

3. The results become evident in high died-of-wounds rates; last minute preparation for transportation missions, putting drivers and mission accomplishment at risk; and little if any situational awareness of the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The MDMP can be used by CSS units to effectively plan, integrate, and synchronize efforts to enhance the capabilities of all EAD units and consequently enhance support to the brigade.

2. Participating in the Leadership Training Program (LTP) at Ft Polk is a valuable training tool to accomplish this.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 37
SUBJECT: Targeting process and targeting meetings

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Most battalion staffs do not understand the basic concepts of the targeting process and intermittently conduct targeting meetings with no agenda or focus.

DISCUSSION: As a result, most units fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff targets (HPTs).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Read and review **FM 6-20-10,** ***Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process***, with emphasis on Chapters 2 and 5, and the Targeting Process Video script in the JRTC FS DIV TTP red book, 1 Oct 96, page 21, to gain a better understanding of the targeting process and the targeting meeting.

2. The battalion XO should open the meeting by detailing its purpose and the agenda, and specifying the time period or event being discussed in the meeting. The S-2 provides an intelligence update. First, he briefs the current enemy situation. Next, the S-2 reviews the current collection and reconnaissance and surveillance plans. Third, he provides a battle damage assessment of targets previously engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy course of action. Next, he provides an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of action and locations for the next 12-24 hours using the event template and a list of high-value targets. Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the PIR for review by the battle staff.

3. The next briefer is the S-3. First, he briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to the commander's intent. Second, he briefs any requirements from higher since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations. Finally, he informs the battle staff of the status of assets available for the targeting process.

4. The third briefer is the battalion FSO. He briefs the status of all delivery assets and reviews the current target synchronization matrix, providing a summary of results of actions taken. Next, he provides the new target synchronization matrix with the proposed list of HPTs and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement. Once any changes to the HPT have been made and any locations updated or refined, the battalion XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix by identifying a detector, determining an attack means, and assigning an asset to assess each HPT.

5. Upon completion of the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the meeting for his approval. Once the results are approved, the following products are updated, written, and reproduced for timely distribution.

a. Target synchronization matrix
b. FRAGO to subordinate units

c. Updated target list
d. Updated R&S plan
e. Any changes to commander's PIR

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 38
SUBJECT: Maneuver unit battle staff integration

OBSERVATION (TF 3): Battalions do not effectively integrate all staff members and BOS into the planning process.

DISCUSSION: Intelligence is not driving maneuver, and the intelligence and fire support BOS are not synchronizing their efforts or sharing information. This results in the battalion fighting its base plan and not modifying it based on the changing enemy situation. There is seldom an adequate CSS plan to support the scheme of maneuver, which causes the battalions to halt operations due to lack of supplies.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Chapters 2 and 8 of **FM 7-20*, The Infantry Battalion***, cover this in detail and need to be applied during operations.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 39
SUBJECT: Aviation unit execution of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision-making process.

DISCUSSION: Staffs do not have a clear understanding of the MDMP and the linkage between the steps. Often the commander is focused on other issues and the executive officer deals predominately with logistical matters.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must know **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations,*** and must understand how the separate staff sections participate in the planning process. Home Station training is a must in order to become proficient in the decision-making process IAW **FM 101-5** as well as the unit's Leadership Training Program (LTP) conducted at the JRTC.
2. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12*, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning,"*** May 97.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 40
SUBJECT: Course-of-action (COA) development

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): The manner in which most units continue to develop an operation around a single COA does not maximize their potential for successful execution.

DISCUSSION:

1. Staffs almost always develop their JRTC operational plans at Home Station prior to a rotation. Sometimes these begin in the LTP. Regardless, most units arrive with predetermined plans. "Plan" is emphasized here and and not "OPLAN" because they are seldom accompanied by assumptions. The plan becomes the single COA when the staff executes the MDMP. It seldom receives elaboration and is almost never put in the context of the current friendly/enemy situation "in the box."

2. Commanders seldom provide any criteria to analyze the COA. Doctrinally, any COA, at a minimum, must be weighed as to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Commanders have an obligation to expand and add to these doctrinal criteria for accepting a COA. This is part and parcel of the commander's vision, intent, and guidance.

3. Staffs seldom provide, nor do commanders ask for, updated staff estimates prior to or during mission analysis. At best, staff estimates are assumed to be whatever they were back at Home Station when the plan was written or they depend entirely on whatever the current battle tracking charts display in the TOC. The latter are seldom explicitly addressed in the MDMP anyway. The impact of these observations is that plans developed in a vacuum away from the JRTC seldom bear out their full potential in terms of BLUFOR success. The plans in general are sound and often audacious. But without analysis within the context of the current situation, without being challenged by success criteria, or without development against current staff estimates, the plans almost always fall short of reasonable success. A frequent example seen at the JRTC is that when units transition between phases, they seldom account for personnel and equipment casualties from the previous phase. Consequently, while the idea behind using a single COA in a time constrained environment is a sound concept, units are not gaining the full training benefit offered by the JRTC, mainly because they do not put the single COA into the present "in the box" context.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Do not write plans ahead of time (or make them OPLANs with attendant assumptions).
2. Use suitable/feasible/acceptable criteria to analyze the COA.
3. Provide time for the staff to develop current staff estimates and then present the results of the analysis to the commander during the mission analysis step of the MDMP.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Course of Action)

TREND 41

SUBJECT: Air defense battery standing operating procedures (SOP)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Lack of air defense battery SOPs hamper unit planning and execution.

DISCUSSION: Although air defense batteries bring their own battalion TACSOPs, these tend to be too general. Units encounter specific problems that require their own unit SOP. Examples of unit SOPs are COMSEC compromise procedures, SHTU/HTU troubleshooting procedures, fire unit priorities of work, sensor management planning, and fire unit survivability/force protection standards.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Once the SOPs are developed, batteries and platoons must verify them in the field to ensure soundness and make changes as necessary. ADA leaders must enforce the SOPs and ensure soldiers follow them.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 42
SUBJECT: Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Often units deploy with a TACSOP that marginally addresses NBC matters and actions.

DISCUSSION: Repeatedly, units discover shortcomings in their TACSOPs such as patient decontamination procedures, CDE equipment reporting, and decontamination site setup.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must review the NBC portion of TACSOPS and ensure they address key and essential activities. Copies or extracts of these TACSOPs must be at all levels in the command, and NBC personnel must have access to them.
2. Brigade and battalion chemical officers must conduct rehearsals with subordinates to ensure that all required actions are understood.
3. Review **FM 3-5,** ***NBC Decontamination Operations***, **FM 8-33,** ***Control of Communicable Diseases in Man***, and **FM 8-285,** ***Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries*****.**

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 43
SUBJECT: Troop-leading procedures

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): The platoon leadership from a cross section of rotational units typically displays a limited understanding of troop-leading procedures.

DISCUSSION: A lack of integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) at brigade with parallel planning conducted at the platoon is the primary cause for the shortfall. Missions not generated through the MDMP are usually an afterthought, tasked on short notice, which forces the platoon leadership to abbreviate their troop-leading procedures or ignore them altogether.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Chemical company commanders and first sergeants must mentor their platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders on combining the procedures for the execution of doctrinal missions.
2. Review **FM 101-5,** ***Staff Organization and Operations,*** and **FM 7-8,** ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.***

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 44
SUBJECT: Internal communications

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Information is diluted in transmission.

DISCUSSION: Solders want (and deserve) to know why actions are being taken. Soldiers who understand both the task and, more importantly, the purpose of their mission will execute their instructions with much more enthusiasm. The "why" imbedded in missions allows leaders at all levels to better understand how their piece fits into the big picture of the battle, and increases awareness of the importance of what may seem an insignificant job at first. Gate guards who understand they are ambassadors for the command and the key to protecting the entire compound (as the first point of contact with the public) have a tendency to be much more vigilant than those who are merely told, "You're the gate guard; don't let anyone in without a password."

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Internal communications must be driven by and through the chain of command. Only by enforcing this means of communication can leaders be sure everyone in the unit has the correct information. Clarity of messages must be ensured through proper feedback. Backbriefs are excellent tools as long as they do not become parroting sessions. As much as possible, include the purpose with the task so that soldiers know why actions are required.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 45
SUBJECT: Medical unit pre-combat inspections

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Once established, inspections by leaders of teams and sections that leave the compound for external missions often are shoddy or nonexistent.

DISCUSSION: Ambulances depart without strip maps or briefings on road conditions, minefield locations, enemy threats, actions in case of ambush, frequencies of supporting or supported units (if they have communications capability), etc. FLAs depart without all necessary medical equipment, putting the driver and crew at a scene unable to provide necessary life support for patients at the scene or en route.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must establish clear checklists for pre-deployment and pre-mission execution. NCOs must take responsibility for ensuring subordinates have been properly prepared for mission execution.
2. Officers must follow up on guidance given to ensure priorities have been established and carried out. SOPs can reflect requirements for PCIs but must be checked periodically to incorporate changes in equipment or missions to ensure the right information is contained in a checklist.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 46
SUBJECT: TOC battle drills

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): TOC personnel do not routinely train and execute battle drills.

DISCUSSION: Reaction to enemy fire, enemy aircraft, NBC, indirect fire, patient movement to and from evacuation vehicles, tent erection, etc., can be reduced to drills.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: All battle drills and missions should be rehearsed as many times as possible at Home Station and not less than 24 hours prior to the need. The consistent and continuous practice of these actions makes the needed response automatic. Do not waste time figuring out what to do or how to do it in the middle of a battle.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 47
SUBJECT: Fire planning

OBSERVATION (DIV FS): Even though the brigade fire support planners integrated fires into the brigade battle plan from a top-down perspective, the bottom-up process was ineffective.

DISCUSSION: Brigade-directed targets are often left out of battalion plans as are battalion-directed targets from company plans. Consequently, brigade targets are seldom refined or executed. Each level, from brigade to company, was planning their own fires, without regard for the plan from higher headquarters. The result was a lack of focus for fire support assets. Often times there were more targets than sensors and shooters, which is indicative of poor target management and synchronization. The end result was more reactive fires as opposed to responsive fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Exercise the 2 - 2/3 rule for fire planning. Give subordinates 2/3 of the time to incorporate higher directed targets into the fire plans. Establish and enforce a hard target refinement cutoff time.
2. Use a multi-echeloned technical rehearsal, ensuring all higher changes in targets are delivered to a sensor and shooter.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 48
SUBJECT: Terrain planning

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): S-2s are not focusing on the terrain aspects of planning.

DISCUSSION: S-2s need to train themselves and their sections using a series of terrain walks, map studies, and historical case studies. They need to develop a keen sense of how the terrain will affect their unit.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S-2s must focus the terrain portion of the mission analysis brief on the result of their analysis; that is, the effect of the terrain on friendly and enemy forces. They must also identify key and decisive terrain.

2. Commanders do not need to see all the terrain factors in excessive detail, but they do need to receive the S-2s analysis.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 49
SUBJECT: Staff battle drills

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Staffs do not have adequate battle drills and standing operating procedures (SOPs) to facilitate efficient troop-leading procedures (TLPs).

DISCUSSION: Staff teamwork is not enforced. The XO is not forceful in requiring staff members to work together and integrate all their products. Staffs lack the knowledge and internalization of the orders process. They commonly fail to identify the decisive points and fail to nest the tasks and purposes of the subordinate units to the decisive points. Commanders fail to enforce the linkage between their intent and the concept of the operation. As a result, subordinate units execute missions without a clear vision of the operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Train all staff elements to do their own intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
2. Conduct frequent order drills with all primary staff.
3. Use a concept sketch as per doctrine when briefing the concept of the operation.
4. The battalion executive officer must enforce timelines, standard of work, and TLP.
5. Review **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations***.
6. Develop SOPs on how to set up a rehearsal site, who will brief/execute, what will be briefed/executed, and to what standard.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 50
SUBJECT: Light/heavy team integration

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Key leaders do not understand light/heavy tactics.

DISCUSSION:

1. Key leaders have a minimal understanding of the capabilities and limitations among light/heavy forces and a poor understanding of heavy team logistical requirements.

2. This results in a de-synchronized fight between dismounted and mounted forces. Units are not focused on their higher unit's decisive point.

3. Heavy task and purpose are not nested to support the company fight. There are no combined arms rehearsals and no direct fire control measures or engagement criteria established.

4. This creates poor communication and C2 relationships.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Mount/remount drills on Bradley vehicles.
2. Establish direct-fire control measures and marking SOPs.
3. Establish SOP for TC/BC communication with dismounted maneuver forces.
4. Conduct combined arms rehearsals on breach, clear defile, provide local/flank security, linkup operations, and MOUT operations.
5. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 98-10,** ***Fighting Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain***.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 51
SUBJECT: Mutual support

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Maneuver units routinely fail to achieve mutual support within the company in both offensive and defensive operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. The failure of mutual support at the company allows the enemy to mass at their decisive point with a superior force achieving their task.
2. Company commanders often fail to do their own IPB.
3. Company commanders often lack the internalization of the orders process, which hampers development of a quality operations order. Commanders routinely fail to determine a decisive point, develop an intent, "nest" platoon tasks and purposes, or develop sufficient maneuver graphics. The result is that platoons are deployed without a clear vision of what they should achieve and how that relates to the company.
4. There is a lack of mutual support during offensive operations which prevents the company from fixing and destroying the enemy once in contact.
5. Lack of mutual support during the defense prevents the company from destroying enemy reconnaissance elements and achieving its purpose for the main battle area fight.
6. Companies often fail to conduct any type of rehearsal prior to execution. Those that are conducted are usually ineffective.
7. Leaders also do not know the capabilities and limitations of their organic and attached weapons systems.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders at the company and platoon level must do their own IPB.
2. Leaders and soldiers must understand their elements task and purpose and how it relates to other friendly units.
3. Rehearsals are key to synchronizing the plan (at company, platoon, and squad). This can also be done at Home Station in the form of TEWTs or other exercises to gain an appreciation of what looks "right" prior to execution in an intensive, time-constrained environment like the JRTC.
4. Review Chapters 4 and 5 of **FM 7-10,** ***The Infantry Rifle Company.***
5. Reference Appendix H of **FM 101-5,** ***Staff Organization and Operations.***
6. Review **FM 101-5-1,** ***Operational Terms and Graphics,*** page 1-107.

7. Reference **CALL Newsletter No. 97-8**, ***Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***.

8. Reference **CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 95-4**, Mar 95, ***"Rehearsals: A Key to Success."***

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 52
SUBJECT: Planning a combined arms breach

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Before the heavy team is employed to conduct a combined arms breach, it must be task-organized with sufficient dismounted infantry and engineers to conduct the mission.

DISCUSSION: The heavy team must also have sufficient time to plan and rehearse breaches.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations,*** provides detailed information on the employment of CME in mechanical breaching, as well as the use of mine-clearing line charges (MICLIC) and manual techniques.

2. A fundamental principle with obstacles employed by the OPFOR during low-intensity conflict: when you find an obstacle, you have found the enemy. The OPFOR will cache additional mines near an obstacle to reseed, and he will overwatch with indirect and/or direct fires.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans and Orders)

TREND 53
SUBJECT: Medical unit use of map graphics

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The CHS graphics should show the positions of the brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes, and primary and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.

DISCUSSION: The brigade should include the CHS graphics with the brigade's operation order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: This allows the commanders to raise any concerns about the MEDEVAC plan at the brigade level.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans and Orders)

TREND 54
SUBJECT: Planning aviation tasks

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Commanders do not have a clear understanding of the aviation tasks necessary to support a search and attack mission.

DISCUSSION: Often, the mission translated at the troop level is to "conduct a search and attack" which does not equate in common terms that the aviator can understand. In other words, "conduct a zone reconnaissance from this phase line (PL) to this PL oriented on finding the enemy" makes more sense to aircrews. Using aviation missions also will facilitate the planning necessary for search and attack. Telling a crew to plan a zone reconnaissance within specified boundaries will force them to plan the aviation tasks necessary to recon the zone in a methodical method. More often than not, the aircrews launch with this kind of guidance: "Conduct search and attack vicinity the BDE TOC" or "Sweep the area around the brigade support area (BSA)." This results in aircrews flying around an area with no methodical search techniques that ensure a systematic movement through a specified zone. Aircrews end up conducting "911" missions with no pre-planned integration with ground units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviators need some consistency in how they operate with certain missions. Rehearsals are essential in practicing the mission no matter what mission is assigned. Other tasks an aviation unit can expect to perform during search and attack operations are area reconnaissance and hasty attacks.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 55
SUBJECT: Aviation unit engagement area planning

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): During the defense phase, troops/companies have the opportunity to conduct detailed engagement area (EA) planning on the proposed EAs generated by brigade to support the defense.

DISCUSSION: Troops/companies are weak in this area for several reasons. One trend is for troops/companies to take the graphics from higher at face value without a detailed map analysis that takes into consideration weapon ranges, fields of fire, and other important information needed to engage targets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: **FM 1-112**, ***Attack Helicopter Operations,*** discusses EA development in great detail. Specifically, eight steps are outlined that if followed ensure adequate detail in the planning process. Additionally, a list of 16 requests for information (RFI) is listed that a commander and staff should be able to answer when reviewing the EA development to ensure the appropriate amount of detail. They are as follows:

1. What are the mission and endstate?
2. Where is the enemy and how will he enter the AO? What does his IPB say?
3. Where are his key weapons? What are their capabilities?
4. Where are we going to kill the enemy?
5. Where will we engage him from? Are the ranges realistic? Are the positions too restrictive?
6. Which enemy systems do we want to engage first?
7. How will we initiate fires?
8. Which weapon systems will fire first? On what signal?
9. What is the desired effect of fires from each system?

10. How will fires be distributed (laterally and in depth)?
11. How will we mass fires? Do we have the required volume? Do we have the time and assets to do the job in the space given?
12. Where will C2 be? Can the commander see the battlefield?
13. How do we shift fires? How do we refocus fires? Why do we shift? Does everybody know the "key event" to cause shifting?
14. How do we deal with enemy reactions to our fires?
15. Have we planned for flank and rear security in the BP?
16. Does the plan follow the principles of direct fire?

By answering these RFIs, the commander can be ensured of "covering all the bases" for EA development. A typical unit may address two or three of these RFIs and consider the plan sound! Based on the terrain at JRTC, which does not support large EAs, it is even more imperative to plan the EA integration in detail. This checklist of questions is an excellent tool to use. In addition to a detailed map analysis, aviation units often do not set aside time for the troops/companies to conduct reconnaissance of the EAs in order to:

1. Confirm proposed ABFs.
2. Confirm fields of fire from the ABFs.
3. Develop alternate ABFs that support the EA.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 56
SUBJECT: Aviation unit use of graphic control measures

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): A common trend is for aircrews to execute missions without graphic control measures on their maps.

DISCUSSION: Graphics, to include unit boundaries, phase lines, named areas of interest (NAI), target reference points (TRP), obstacles, friendly locations, etc., are often missing on maps. Kiowa Warrior (KW) crews rely heavily on AMPS and the internal cockpit display, which is limited to the amount of information that can be input for display. Aircrews must maintain situational awareness, and having correct and complete graphics will go a long way in fostering awareness. The "new aviator" is technically proficient and relies heavily on technology imbedded in the advanced airframes now on the battlefield. Many aviators are losing the "old school" of doing things; i.e., using a map to navigate and using a map with graphics posted are two examples. A perfect scenario to highlight this point occurred on a rotation where a team of KWs was given an in-flight mission change to move to the BSA and provide AA security. At the time, the KW team was only 4 kilometers from the BSA (which was located 1 kilometer from the aviation AA). They had to stop and ask for a grid to the BSA and then program the grid into the aircraft to get the steering cursor to the BSA.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Aircrews must have situational awareness. They must be proficient with a map and with graphics they are provided. Graphics must be doctrinal and accurate.
2. Review **FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*.**

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 57
SUBJECT: Combat Health Support (CHS) rehearsals

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Units normally conduct CHS rehearsals as a portion of the combat service support (CSS) rehearsal. This de-emphasizes the focus needed on the plan to evacuate casualties.

DISCUSSION: This may then result in an increase in the died-of-wounds (DOW) rate. Additionally, not all key personnel are present for the rehearsal.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade S-1 should schedule separate CHS rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline. Participants should include, but are not limited to: brigade surgeon; brigade S-1; Forward Support Medical Company (FSMC) commander; medical platoon leaders; FSB commander; FSB S-1; FSB support operations officer; corps-level medical unit LNO; division medical operations cell (DMOC) representative; line company 1SGs; brigade S-3 air; aviation LNO; designated CASEVAC pilots; FSB or brigade S-2; brigade signal officer.
2. The CHS rehearsal is conducted in the following manner:
   a. Brigade S-1 briefs an overview of the tactical operation.
   b. FSB or brigade S-2 briefs the intelligence update.
   c. Medical planners conduct an action/reaction drill.
   d. Mass casualty (MASCAL) procedures are discussed.
   e. Review with a walk-through of all participants from point of injury to a level III care facility.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 58
SUBJECT: Home Station leader training

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Home Station leader training in tactical skills requires significant improvement.

DISCUSSION: Officer professional development and NCO professional development (OPD/NCOPD) is negligent in how to conduct movement to contact, rehearsals, IPB, task and purpose, defense, modern weapons and their capabilities, and the essentials of OPORDs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TWET) at Home Station.
2. Conduct sand table exercises with the unit leadership.
3. Use "what now" leader exercises to train leaders on how to respond to various situations.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 59
SUBJECT: Officer and NCO professional development

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units are not sufficiently using OPD and NCOPD in preparing themselves for the JRTC.

DISCUSSION: Same as trend 59 above.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 59 above.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 60
SUBJECT: Rehearsals after the intermediate staging base

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Once units depart the intermediate staging base (ISB), rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the unit on the operation.

DISCUSSION: Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in **FM 7-20,** ***The Infantry Battalion***, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list. Rehearsal techniques listed in **FM 6-20-1,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for theField Artillery Cannon Battalion***, are not being used.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a sound standing operating procedure (SOP) to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.
2. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires. The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.
3. **FM 6-20-1**, pages 3-12 through 3-15, provides an excellent overview of key rehearsal elements.
4. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home Station training, would greatly improve rehearsals.
5. Review **CALL Newsletter No. 98-7,** ***Rehearsals,*** for techniques on conducting rehearsals.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 61
SUBJECT: Chemical asset integration

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): While there is demonstrated improvement in the integration of NBC assets within units at the JRTC, it still remains a weakness.

DISCUSSION: Many brigades are not giving NBC assets a clearly defined task and purpose. Decontamination, smoke, and reconnaissance assets are repeatedly left performing missions such as convoy escort, ROWPU security, manning TCPs, and troop transportation missions. These are non-METL missions that NBC elements can accomplish when they are either not conducting flame field expedient or smoke operations and there is a very low NBC threat. But as the situation changes and the threat increases, NBC assets must be employed in their doctrinal roles enhancing force protection. There are many instances where smoke assets could be combat multipliers but are often omitted. Most of the reluctance seems to come from either a lack of comfort by senior leaders on how to employ NBC assets (due to a lack of Home Station training with these assets) or a lack of confidence in their chemical staff.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Senior leader training and unit execution prior to the rotation would help solve this.
2. There are instances of units being slow in relinquishing control of chemical assets (platoon is a part of the FSB perimeter and the commander not wanting to give up the asset) when directed. This hinders the NBC fight. By the time a persistent chemical strike occurs, decontamination response is slow because the decontamination plan never matured. The plan did not include the creation of clean or dirty routes in the area and the brigade did not execute "proactive" decontamination site reconnaissance and setup.
3. Chemical officers must stress the proper use of NBC assets during the planning of operations, and then must check to ensure that the assets are being used as intended and are still capable of executing tasks assigned. Furthermore, decision-makers, such as brigade and battalion commanders, executive officers, and S-3s, must listen to chemical personnel and the advice that they provide.
4. Situational awareness by chemical officers and NCOs is paramount, and a complete understanding of upcoming operations is the key to the integration of NBC assets as well as the synchronization of their activities.
5. **FM 3-100, *Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals,*** gives a good basis for the doctrinal employment of NBC assets.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 62
SUBJECT: CSS staff coordination

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): For CSS, unit support operations are essential. A common mistake is to run support operations in a vacuum.

DISCUSSION: Missions come and go without the benefit of interrelating with other staff sections. It is not unusual to have support operations sections not coordinate with the S-3 or S-2.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Support operations personnel must be aware of what other staff sections can provide to enhance service support to the customer. Do not operate in a vacuum. Develop a mission brief system that captures this important information and pass it down to the supporting element that will accomplish the mission.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 63
SUBJECT: Mutual support

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Mutual support during search and attack operations and mutual support between maneuver elements is often not considered.

DISCUSSION: Search and attack operations in zones focused on finding the enemy but did not adequately address how to fix and finish the enemy in a timely manner. Companies and platoons were often separated by distances that prevented any rapid movement of maneuver forces to assist in the destruction of an identified enemy force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Increased attention to planning operations that facilitate mutual support between forces would greatly increase the battalion's ability to fix and finish the enemy.
2. The battalion and companies should conduct time/distance analysis to ensure that forces operate within supporting distances of one another. Task organization of find, fix, and finish forces with a clear task and purpose which addresses each function would also greatly increase the ability of the battalion to destroy the enemy.
3. Detailed planning on the employment of all available combat multipliers is vital to mission success.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 64
SUBJECT: Unified maintenance

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Maintenance units have difficulty understanding the concept of maintenance in operations other than war.

DISCUSSION: One AVUM is assigned responsibility in the OPORD for task force maintenance of all the attached assets. In a normal rotation, this generally will include three to four different types of airframes. Most AVUMs have difficulty unifying the maintenance effort, which results in poor status reporting to the task force commander and, in most instances, higher NMCM and NMCS rates.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The task force commander should unify the maintenance effort by attaching the maintenance test pilots, mechanics, and technical inspectors for each type of airframe to the AVUM who is delegated the responsibility for maintenance operations IAW the TF OPORD.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 65
SUBJECT: Troop briefings

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): A recurring trend at the JRTC is the total disregard of troop-level briefings and rehearsals.

DISCUSSION: Troops rarely follow the troop-leading procedures once they enter the maneuver box. This is often a function of inadequate planning time allocated from squadron level, but more often than not, it is a function of commanders being satisfied with minimal information to conduct a mission. In other words, "Go to this grid, at this time, and kill whatever you see." Commanders opt to send teams to the TOC to get their mission brief from the S-3 or S-2 instead of planning and briefing a mission. Commanders that do brief at the troop level often "gloss over" the detail that should be discussed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders must go back to the basic "blocking and tackling" needed to thoroughly brief missions.
2. Leaders must use the troop-leading procedures as an outline to follow in preparation for the mission, then use the OPORD format to brief the mission.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 66
SUBJECT: Mission projection

OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Mission projection continues to prove difficult for units at the company level.

DISCUSSION: Typical missions such as CASEVAC and CSS are often passed to assault companies within one hour of execution. This normally results in a crew flying a mission without proper preparation. Normally crews sacrifice an update on the enemy and friendly situation to ensure they meet critical time requirements. Standby crews often fail to PCI aircraft and receive updates prior to assuming standby status which tends to exacerbate problems.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The fix for this is to ensure the proper level of command stresses to aircrews the importance of conducting preflight, PCI, and S-2/S-3 update briefings prior to assuming their shifts. With minimal effort, commanders can adjust duty periods for crews that allow these steps to occur and still remain within their fighter management cycle.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 67
SUBJECT: Rules of engagement (ROE) training

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 OPLAW): Brigade trial counsel are not training unit personnel on mission-specific ROE at Home Station or the intermediate staging base (ISB).

DISCUSSION: ROE must be mission-specific.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Get the mission-specific ROE from the operation order (OPORD) as soon as it is available. Review it for ROE items that should be trained at the "shooter" level. Determine

what elements are deploying with your unit, including slice elements. Coordinate with these elements for ROE training prior to deploying.

2. Conduct classroom and STX lane training for the best possible effect.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 68

SUBJECT: Pre-deployment and pre-combat inspections (PCI)

OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Invariably, units arrive missing vital pieces of equipment or parts necessary to put equipment into operation.

DISCUSSION: The absence of things as simple as computer disks, or electrical connectors, or keys to oxygen cylinders, or extension cords for key areas can cripple a unit. ISO shelters and their contents are often not inspected prior to deployment, resulting in unexpected problems once the units begin to set up. PMCSs are seldom accomplished on medical equipment until after the unit has established in the field, again resulting in the late discovery of non-mission capable status of vital equipment. In too many instances, users knew of the shortfalls but had taken no action to remedy the problem before deployment.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must establish clear checklists for pre-deployment and pre-mission execution. NCOs must take responsibility for ensuring subordinates have been properly prepared for mission execution.
2. Officers must follow up on guidance given to ensure priorities have been established and carried out.
3. SOPs can reflect requirements for PCIs but must be checked periodically to incorporate changes in equipment or missions to ensure the right information is contained in the checklist.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 69

SUBJECT: Treatment of civilians on the battlefield

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 OPLAW): Soldiers show a lack of skill interacting with civilians.

DISCUSSION: In almost every rotation, soldiers are confronted with civilians and do not know how to deal with them.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Schedule and conduct unit laws of war and human rights training as soon as notice is received of an impending deployment. Conduct both classroom and STX lane training for the best possible effect.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 70
SUBJECT: Staff integration and synchronization

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Many platoon leaders do not fully understand where and how in the planning process they provide their input to integrate and synchronize military police (MP) support with the brigade combat team (BCT) operation.

DISCUSSION: There are also problems taking information received from the BCT and producing timely combat orders for the platoon so that junior leaders can begin their troop-leading procedures and parallel planning. Many platoon leaders fail to ensure that MPs are included in the brigade's TACSOP. Platoons are plagued with 911 missions. Proper integration, synchronization, and mission prioritization of MP assets will prevent many of the 911 missions which are uncoordinated, unplanned, and unrehearsed. These unrehearsed missions lead to many unnecessary casualties and lost critical assets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. At Home Station, the Provost Marshal, commander, and platoon leader should conduct continuous leader/staff training at brigade on MP capabilities and employment. The platoon leader, with help from the BCT commander, must ensure that MPs are included in the BCT's TACSOP.
2. The MP annex to the TACSOP should describe capabilities, employment considerations, doctrinal missions, prioritization, and specific collective tasks that support the brigade mission essential task list (METL) tasks.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 71
SUBJECT: Commander's guidance for fire support

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.

DISCUSSION: Most commanders are using the format of **FM 6-71, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire support for the Combined Arms Commander***, while writing their guidance for fire support, using Purpose, Priority, Allocation and Restriction (PPAR). Recently, some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method and Endstate. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support. The terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass are not being used properly at the JRTC.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 6-71,** page 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOS. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. **FM 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process***, states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure the commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct and that fire support assets are available to achieve the attack guidance.

3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 72
SUBJECT: Logistical synchronization

OBSERVATIONS (FS DIV): There is a lack of a logistical synchronization in the ALOC.

DISCUSSION: This lack of synchronization has resulted in support that was not integrated within the field artillery (FA) battalions of FSB or within the brigade combat team.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Conduct a deliberate planning and synchronizing meeting projecting 72-96 hours out with the battalion XO, S-1 and NCO, S-4 and NCO, SPL and NCO, HHS BC and first sergeant, PA chaplain, battalion motor officer and battalion motor technician (BMO and BMT), commo sergeant, and RSO.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 73
SUBJECT: Tactical drop zone (DZ) survey

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Units are experiencing difficulities with the timely submission of the Tactical Drop Zone Survey (AF Form 3823).

DISCUSSION: Units are required to submit their survey NLT 24 hours prior to the scheduled drop. Units who fail to submit the survey within that time period will have their container delivery system (CDS) dropped into the alternate drop zone. The unit's battle rhythm becomes de-synchronized, as they now have to plan for a larger movement to the drop zone than was orginally expected.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must submit their tactical drop zone survey at least 36-48 hours prior to the first scheduled drop. This type of proactive planning will enable the unit to react if a survey is disapproved.
2. Units must ensure the approved survey is on the brigades's maneuver graphics. This will reduce the terrain management problems within the brigade sector and will also inform all units within the sector where the drop zone is located.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 74
SUBJECT: Fire support targeting synchronization

OBSERVATION (TF 1): While battalions aggressively use attack aviation, mechanized and armored assets, and indirect fire to synchronize combat power on the battlefield, the effectiveness of indirect fire as a combat multiplier suffers from a lack of detailed planning.

DISCUSSION: Efforts to get rounds on target typically resulted in delays while fires were cleared, communications established, or appropriate fire control measures delineated. As an illustration: Of 104 defensive targets planned by three different battalions, only six were refined, covered by an observer, tied to an obstacle, and had a trigger. In terms of target management, only 7 percent of all targets planned met the criteria of the FSO plotting the target, the battalion mortars and field artillery FDCs having the target, and a unit designated to observe the target.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to **FM 6-71,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,*** for more detailed discussions on fire support for the combined arms commander and techniques for observed fire.
2. Review **FM 6-30,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire***, for more detailed discussions on fire support for the combined arms commander and techniques for observed fire.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)